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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Electrical Power Generation/Power Reactant
Storage and Distribution Subsystem FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE 8UMMI_Y
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. i0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical
Power Generation/Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
(EPG/PRSD) subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baselines with
proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter EPG/PRSD hardware.
In the analysis report, the PRSD hardware was divided into seven
sections. However, in the assessment report, the PRSD has been
divided into eight sections for the hardware divisions and the
FMEA/CIL count comparison. Some of the components in the
sections were moved to other sections to facilitate the
comparison.
The IOA product for the EPG/PRSD analysis consisted of one
hundred sixty-two failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in
eighty-two potential critical items being identified. Comparison
was made to the NASA baseline (as of 23 July 1986) which
consisted of ninety-two FMEAs and fifty-eight CIL items. An
additional comparison was conducted to an updated FMEA/CIL list
(as of 18 March 1987) which consisted of sixty-six FMEAs and
thirty-nine CIL items. The comparison caused the IOA to generate
four additional failure modes to match the NASA FMEAs, but four
others were considered non-credible, and deleted. The final
comparison was conducted with a revised FMEA/CIL list (as of 7
January 1988). This revision consists of two, three, and four
tank configurations, instead of the earlier baseline of just two
tanks. The baselines are broken down as follows: 2-Tank) sixty-
four FMEAs and thirty-nine CIL items, 3-Tank) sixty-seven FMEAs
and forty-two CIL items, and 4-Tank) sixty-seven FMEAS and forty-
two CIL items. The comparisons and the discussion with the NASA
subsystem manager reduced the EPG/PRSD analysis to seventy-seven
failure mode worksheets and thirty-two critical items.
Figure 1 presents a comparison of the proposed post 51-L NASA
three or four tank baseline, with IOA recommended baseline, and
issues. The IOA column is the number of FMEA and CILs after they
were mapped (grouped) together so a direct comparison could be
made with NASA's failure modes (IOA was more likely to produce a
report for each item, while NASA, where possible, group similar
items under the same failure mode).
The comparison determined if there were any results which had
been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This
comparison produced agreement on all but twenty-seven FMEAs and
nine CIL items. The discrepancy between the number of IOA
findings and NASA FMEAs can be partially explained by the
different approaches used by IOA and NASA to group failure modes
together to form one FMEA. Also, several IOA items represented
inner tank components and ground operations failure modes which
were not in the NASA baseline. The remaining issues arose due to
differences between the NASA and IOA FMEA/CIL preparation
instructions. NASA had used an older ground rules document which
has since been superseded by the NSTS 22206 used by the IOA.
mm
I
R
i
I
u
I
m
I
U
g
I
g
mm
m
i
I
ww
u4
u_
0
Figure 1 - EPG/PRSD FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being Used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
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2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into componentsrand low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is Summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
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Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B.
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3.0 8UBSYSTEN DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The EPG/PRSD consists of hardware that is required for cryogenic
hydrogen and oxygen storage and distributio_o the Fuel Cell
Powerplants (FCP) and Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control
Subsystem (ARPCS). Reference Figures 2 and 3. The grouping of
the EPG/PRSD components has changed slightly from the analysis
report, in order to facilitate the FMEA, CIL, and issues count
comparison• The check valves, tank relief valves, and relief
ports were relocated to the relief valve/filter packages• The
EPG/PRSD consists of the following divisions:
lu The Hydrogen (H2) tanks can number from 2 to 5 (each
tank having a 1:1 correspondence to an oxygen tank).
The H2 reactant is stored in the tank at an initial
temperature of -424 degrees F. Each tank consists of
an A and B heater, heater controller pressure sensor,
tank pressure sensor, fluid temperature sensor,
quantity sensor, heater assembly temperature sensor,
and fill and vent Quick Disconnects (QD) with caps.
The reactant flow to the fuel cells is regulated by the
heater controller. Reference Figure 4.
2_ There is a H2 Relief Valve/Filter Package (HRVFP) for
each H2 tank. All HRVFPs have a filter, and tank
relief valve and the ones for tanks 1 and 2 contain a
manifold relief valve, while those for tanks 1 through
4 contain a check valve• Packages 1, 2, and 4 share
relief port 1, and packages 3 and 5 share relief port
2. The filters extract reactant impurities which could
degrade fuel cell performance. The manifold relief
valves relieve excess manifold pressure by allowing
reactants to flow into tanks 1 or 2. The check valves
prevent reactants from flowing back into the tank in
the event it is at a low pressure. Tanks 4 and 5 share
a check valve. Reference Figure 5.
• There are 2 H2 Valve Modules (HVM). Both HVMs contain a
manifold shutoff valve and its position indicator, and
a manifold pressure sensor. HVM 1 contains a
horizontal drain QD and cap. HVM 1 also contains one
fuel cell reactant supply valve and its position
sensor, while HVM 2 contains two of each. HVM 2 also
contains a Ground Support Equipment (GSE) valve and its
position indicator and a GSE Time Zero (T-O) fill QD.
The manifold valves can be used to isolate manifold 1
from 2. The GSE valve and fill QD allow the fuel cells
to run on ground reactants before launch. Reference
Figure 6.
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a The Oxygen (02) tanks flown on a mission can number
from 2 to 5. The 02 reactant is stored in the tank at
an initial temperature of -300 degrees F. Each tank
contains heaters labeled A1, A2, B1 and B2, with one
heater assembly consisting of A1 and B1 and the other
containing A2 and B2. The tanks also consist of a
temperature sensor for each heater assembly, fluid
temperature sensor, quantity sensor, pressure sensor,
heater controller pressure sensor, fill QD and cap, and
vent QD and cap. In a five tank configuration, the B
heater in tanks 4 and 5 are not operational. Reference
Figure 7.
. There is an 02 Relief Valve/Filter Package (ORVFP) for
each 02 tank. All ORVFPs have a filter and tank
relief valve, plus the ones for tanks 1 and 2 contain a
manifold relief valve, while those for tanks 1 through
4 contain a check valve. All packages share a relief
port. Reference Figure 8.
. There are two 02 Valve Modules (OVM). Both OVMs
contain a manifold shutoff valve and its position
indicator, a manifold pressure sensor, and an
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS)
system supply valve and its position sensor. OVM 1
contains one fuel cell reactant supply valve and its
position sensor, while OVM 2 contains two of each. OVM
1 contains a GSE valve and its position indicator, and
a GSE fill T-O QD. OVM 2 contains a horizontal drain
QD and cap. Reference Figure 9.
. The H2 and 02 lines, components, and fittings (HOLCF)
made up two separate hardware categories outside of the
six major divisions, but were grouped together into one
category for the FMEA and CIL issue count comparison.
. The H2 and 02 fill and vent QDs, horizontal drain QDs,
GSE fill T-O QDs and their caps (QDCAP) were grouped
together as a category only for the FMEA and CIL issue
count comparison.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The EPG/PRSD interfaces directly with the FCP and ARPCS.
Hydrogen and Oxygen are supplied to the FCPs while oxygen is
supplied to the ARPCS. The PRSD subsystem components are
installed in the mid-fuselage of the Orbiter beneath the payload
bay liner. The H2 and 02 tanks are arranged on both sides of the
mid-fuselage in a random type of order. Reference Figure 10.
The 02 and H2 relief and drain ports are located on both sides of
the Orbiter fuselage. Reference Figures Ii and 12.
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B.3 Hierarchy
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the hierarchy of the EPG and PRSD
systems hardware, respectively, and the corresponding
subcomponents. The PRSD subsystems are depicted in Figures 4
through 9.
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Figure 3 - PRSD SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 4 - PRSD HYDROGEN TANKS
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Figure 5 - PRSD H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
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Figure 6 - PRSD H2 VALVE MODULES
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Figure 7 - PRSD OXYGEN TANKS
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Figure 8 - PRSD 02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
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Figure 9 - PRSD 02 VALVE MODULES
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Figure i0 - PRSD COMPONENT LOCATIONS
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Figure 12 - PRSD PORTS - RIGHT SIDE
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the EPG/PRSD hardware initially generated one
hundred sixty two failure mode worksheets and identified eighty-
two Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the
assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, four
additional failure mode analysis worksheets were generated.
These analysis results were first compared to the proposed NASA
Post 51-L baseline of ninety-two FNEAs and fifty-eight CIL items,
and then to the updated version of slay-six FHEAs and thirty-
nine CIL items, and finally to three different baseline
configurations: 2-Tank) Sixty-four FMEAs and thirty-nine CIL
items, 3&4-Tank) Sixty-seven FMEAs and forty-two CIL items. The
discrepancy between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be
explained by four different reasons:
1) Eight issues arose from inner tank component FMEAs that
had not been covered by NASA, but which may have been
covered by the tank manufacturer, Beech Aircraft.
2) Two issues were due to FMEAs the NASA subsystem manager
thought should be covered under the ground operations
FMEAs.
3) Thirteen issues were caused by the differences between the
Rockwell International reliability desk instructions No.
100-2G and the NSTS 22206.
4) Four issues can be explained by the different approach
used by NASA and IOA to group failure modes.
Upon completion of the assessment, and after discussions with the
NASA subsystem manager, nineteen of the seventy-seven recommended
FMEAs were in agreement. Of the fifty-eight that remained,
twenty-seven had minor discrepancies that did not affect
criticality.
In the analysis report, the PRSD was divided into seven sections
according to hardware and location. However, in the assessment
report the PRSD has been divided into eight sections to
facilitate comparison to the NASA FMEAs. Some of the components
in the sections were moved to other sections while the QDs and
caps were grouped into a new section called QDCAP. -_i
In the tabulation below, the various failure mode and FMEA counts
are compared. The unmapped IOA column is the raw number of IOA
failure mode worksheets. The mapped IOA column is the number of
IOA failure modes after they have been mapped into the NASA
FMEAs for comparison. The NASA column is the number of FMEAs for
the three or four tank baseline.
u
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E PG/PRS D Unmapped Mapped
Sections IOA IO_ NASA _s_ues
H2 Tank 20 8 4 6
HRVFP 15 9 9 3
HVM 21 14 14 3
02 Tank 23 8 4 6
ORVFP 14 8 8 3
OVM 27 18 18 4
HOLCF 30 2 2 0
QDCAP 16 i0 _
TOTAL 166 77 67 27
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs three or four tank
baseline assessed, versus the IOA five tank configuration
baseline, and identified issues is presented in Table I.
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Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
Component NASA IOA Issues
H2 Tank
HRVFP
HVM
02 Tank
ORVFP
OVM
HOLCF
QDCAP
4
9
14
4
8
18
2
8
8
9
14
8
8
18
2
i0
6
3
3
6
3
4
0
2
TOTAL 67 77 27
l
D
I
The IOA FMEA total is ten greater than the NASA FMEA total,
because IOA, for completeness, recommends the addition of ten new
FMEAs. Unmapped there are 26 assessment worksheets of
criticality flight HDW/FUNC: 3/3, and three assessment worksheets
of criticality flight HDW/FUNC: 3/1R that NASA may want to
consider adding.
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items for three or four
tank baseline asse§sed, versus IOA five tank baseline, any issues
identified is presented in Table If.
Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component
H2 Tank
HRVFP
HVM
02 Tank
NASA
2
8
6
2
IOA Issues
1
1
2
1
ORVFP
OVM
HOLCF
QDCAP
1
3
0
0
7 3
7 6
2 2
8 8
42 32TOTAL 9
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Starting at section 4.1 the FMEA and CIL issues are discussed for
the above component divisions. Appendix C presents the detailed
assessment worksheets for each failure mode identified and
assessed. Appendix D highlights the NASA Critical Items and
corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix E contains IOA analysis
worksheets supplementing previous analysis results reported in
Space Transportation System Engineering and Operations Support
(STSEOS) Working Paper No. 1.0-WP-VA86001-11, Analysis of the
EPG/PRSD, 12 December 1986. Appendix F provides a cross reference
between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA
recommendations are also summarized.
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Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the three or four tank Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
Further discussion of each of these subdivisions and the
applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
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TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality: i/I 2/IR
H2 Tank 2 -
HRVFP - 3
HVM - 4
02 Tank 2 -
ORVFP - 3
OVM - 6
HOLCF 2 -
QDCAP - 6
212
u
3/IR
4
6
1
2
5
1
2
3/2R
1
1
3/3
2
8
4
i0
2
TOTAL
8
9
14
8
8
18
2
i0
TOTAL 6 22 - 21 2 26 77
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Of the failure modes analyzed, thirty-two were determined to be
critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items
is presented in Table IV.
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TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
2/IR 2/2 TOTALCriticality:
H2 Tank
HRVFP
HVM
02 Tank
ORVFP
OVM
HOLCF
QDCAP
TOTAL
i/I
2
2
2
w
3
4
3
6
u
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3/IR
1
m
1
m
2
4
3/2R
m
3/3
3
3
4
3
3
6
2
8
32
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
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Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers
Component IOA ID Number
H2 Tank
HRVFP
HVM
02 Tank
ORVFP
OVM
HOLCF
QDCAP
PRSD-203 to 210, 216 to 227
PRSD-211, 212, 214, 215, 230 to 232, 234,
235, 237, 238, 240, 241, 243, 244
PRSD-249 to 253, 255, 256, 258, 259, 261,
262, 264, 265, 267, 268, 350, 351, 356,
357, 362X, 363X
PRSD-318 to 332, 337 to 344
PRSD-272, 273, 307, 308, 310, 311, 313,
314, 333 to 335, 358 to 360
PRSD-275, 276, 278, 279, 281, 282, 286 to
290, 292, 293, 295, 296, 301, 302, 304,
305, 348, 349, 352 to 355, 364X, 365X
PRSD-213, 228, 229, 233, 236, "239, 242,
245, 254, 257, 260, 263, 266, 269, 274,
277, 280, 283, 291, 294, 297, 303, 306,
309, 312, 315 to 317, 336, 361
PRSD-200 to 202, 246 to 248, 270, 271,
284, 285, 298, 299, 300, 345 to 347
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To facilitate comparison with the NASA FMEAs, several IOA failure
modes were moved to other sections, a new section was created,
and four new worksheets were written. This combined effect
causes comparison of the before and after unmapped worksheet
counts to be difficult. This effect can be seen on the next
page.
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IComponent
Analysis Report
Worksheets
Assessment Report
Wo_ksheets
H2 Tank 28 20
HRVFP I0 15
HVM 36 21
02 Tank 30 23
ORVFP i0 14
OVM 44 27
HOLCF 4 30
QDCAP - 16
TOTAL 162 166
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The previous tables have dealt with comparing IOA's five tank
baseline to NASA's three or four tank baseline. The main
difference between these tank configurations is the number of
items to consider - this has not effected the criticality. The
two tank configuration have differences when compared to the
other baselines that does effect criticality, and in eight cases
the failure mode does not occur in the two tank baseline. These
differences in FMEA/CIL are listed in Table VI.
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TABLE VI Baseline Comparisons
NASA IOA
Component
HRVFP
HVM
ORVFP
OVM
HOLCF
NASA ID #
cv030-1 (3&4)
cv030-2 (3&4)
vPo4s-I (3&4)
LV031-2 (2)
(3&4)
(2)
(3_4)
LV044-2 (3&4)
cvolo-i (3&4)
cv010-2 (3_4)
LVOII-2 (2)
(3_4)
(2)
(3_4)
LV024-2 (3&4)-
AOIFSH-I (3&4)
AOIFSO-I (3&4)
IOA ID #
237
238
215
253
265
262
313
314
293
296
302
239
315
FMEA
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
3/IR
2/IR
3/IR
i/I
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
3/iS
2/iR
3/IR
I/l
CI FMEA
X 2/IR
X 3/IR
X 3/IR
X 2/2R
X 3/2R
X 2/2R
x 3/2R
X 2/IR
x 2/IR
X 3/IR
X 2/2R
X 3/2R
X 2/2R
X 3/2R
X 2/1R
x i/i
x I/i
PCI
X
X
X
X
X
X
Prefixes for NASA ID #s are: (2) = 04-IB-
(3) - M4-1BI-
(4) = M4-1B2-
Prefix for IOA ID #s is: PRSD-
Table VI shows the issues that have been resolved since NASA has
adopted three baseline configurations versus the former two tank
baseline. In the remarks section of the assessment worksheets in
appendix C, the differences between baseline configurations are
listed, ........
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H2 Tank Assessment Results
The assessment between the IOA recommended failure modes and
the latest NASA FMEAbaseline produced six FMEA issues and
one CIL issue. Four issues are due to inner tank components
that NASA had not covered. These are the failure modes of
the tank heater elements failing off (PRSD-210), tank heater
assembly temperature sensors (PRSD-219 to 221),tank fluid
temperature sensors (PRSD-222 to 224), and tank quantity
sensors (PRSD-225 to 227). Two issues ire Created by a
difference in mapping. For the tank subassemblies, the IOA
recommends that the failure mode of external leakage (PRSD-
216) be separate from FMEA 04-1-TK030-1, which also covers
rupture. For the tank heater controller pressure
transducers, the IOA recommends that the failure mode of
zero output (PRSD-207) be separate from FMEA 04-I-MT039-I,
because it has a vastly different effect on PRSD operation
than does full output. PRSD-216 is also a CIL issue because
it is a criticality 1/1. The failure mode of the tank
heater elements failing on (PRSD-209) was deleted because it
is covered by the EPD&C/PRSD analysis. The component
changes from the analysis report were the moving of the tank
relief valves and relief ports 1 and 2 into the HRVFP
section.
HRVFP Assessment Results
The assessment produced three FMEA issues and one CIL
issues. The three FMEA issues are the failure modes of the
tank relief valves failing open (PRSD-211), relief port 1
having restricted flow (PRSD-214), and manifold relief
valves failing open (PRSD-231 and 234). These are caused by
NSTS 22206 stating that screen B should be NA because these
components are standby redundant. The CIL issue is PRSD-231
and 234 because changing screen B to NA allows it to be
deleted from the CIL. The component changes from the
analysis report were the additions of the tank relief valves
and relief ports 1 and 2, and the combining of the check
valves.
HVMAssessment Results
The assessment produced three FMEA issues and two CIL
issues. All three FMEA issues involved passing screen B due
to NSTS 22206 because there is a valve position indicator.
These are the failure modes of the fuel cell reactant supply
valves failing open (PRSD-255,258, and 261), manifold cross-
over valves failing open (PRSD-252 and 264) and GSE supply
valve failing closed (PRSD-267). The IOA also recommended
that the hardware criticality for PRSD-252 and 264 be
changed from a 2 to a 3. If the manifold crossover valves
failed open, all reactant could be depleted out failed open
tank and manifold relief valves. The latter two FMEA issues
also are CIL issues because the IOA recommended changes
cause them to no longer qualify as CILs. During the IOA
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4.5
4.6
assessment, two failure modes were developed to cover the
GSE valve position indicator failure modes of reading open
when the valve is closed (PRSD-362X) and reading closed when
the valve is open (PRSD-363X). The component changes from
the analysis report were the deletion of a check valve and
the addition of a GSE supply valve position indicator.
02 Tank Assessment Results
The assessment produced six FMEA issues and one CIL issue.
Four issues are due to inner tank components that NASA had
not covered. These are the failure modes of the tank
quantity sensors (PRSD-318 to 320), tank fluid temperature
sensors (PRSD-321 to 323), tank heater assembly temperature
sensors (PRSD-324 to 329), and tank heater elements failing
off (P_D;338). _o issues are created by a difference in
mapping. For the tank subassemblies, the IOA recommends
that the failure mode of external leakage (PRSD-330) be
separate from FMEA 04Ul;TK010-1, which also covers rupture.
For the tank heater controller pressure transducers, the IOA
recommends that the failure mode of zero output (PRSD-340)
be separate from _ 04;I-MT0i8-i because it has a vastly
different effect on PRSD operation than does full output.
PRSD-330 is also a CIL issue because it is a criticality
1/1. The failure mode of the tank heater elements failing
on (PRSD;337) was deleted because it is covered by the
EPD&C/PRS_analysis. The component changes from the
analysis report were the moving of the tank relief valves
and relief port into the ORVFP section.
:_=::
ORVFP Assessment Results
The assessment produced three _ issues and one CIL
issues. The three FMEA issues are the failure modes of the
relief port (PRSD-333), tank relief valves failing open
(PRSD-334), and manifold relief valves failing open (PRSD-
307 and 310). These are caused by NSTS 22206 stating that
screen B should be NA because these components are standby
redundant. The CIL issue is represented by PRSD-307 and
310. This should be deleted from the CIL because screen B
is NA. The component changes from the analysis report were
the additions of the tank relief valves, relief port, and
the combining of the check valves.
OVM Assessment Results
The assessment produced four FMEA issues and three CIL
issues. Ali four FMEA issues involved passing screen B due
to NSTS 22206 because there is a valve position indicator.
These are the failure modes of the GSE supply valve failing
open (PRSD-275), ECLSS system supply valves failing open
(PRSD-278 and 281), manifold crossover valves failing open
(PRSD-292 and 295), and fuel cell reactant supply valves
failing open (PRSD-289,301, and 304). The IOA also
recommends that the hardware criticality for PRSD-292 and
27
295 be changed from a 2 to a 3. If the manifold crossover
valves failed open, all reactant could be depleted out
failed open tank and manifold relief valves. The first
three FMEA issues listed above are also CIL issues because
passing screen B_,allows them_to bedeleted from the CIL.
During the IOA assessment , two failure modes were developed
to cover the GSE supply valve position indicator failure
modes of reading open when the valve is closed (PRSD-364X)
and reading closed when the valve is open (PRSD-365X). The
component changes from the analysis report were the deletion
of a check valve and the addition of a GSE supply valve
position indicator.
HOLCF Assessment Results
The assessment produced zero FMEA issues and zero CIL issues.
This section has two FMEAs dealing with external leakage for
all the lines, fittings, and most components. The only
components with separate FMEAs for external leakage were QDs
and caps. The failure modes for the H2 (PRSD-229) and 02
(PRSD-317) lines, components, and fittings having restricted
flow were deleted because this was considered non-credible.
4.8 QDCAP Assessment Results
The assessment produced two FMEA issues and zero CIL issues.
of theThe failure modes on the inabiiity- _ H2 (PRSD-201,247,
and 271), and 02 (PRSD-285,299, and 347) fill and vent,
horizontal drain, and GSE fill T-O QDs to mate/demate were
not covered by the NASA subsystem manager because it was
thought these were covered under ground operations. The IOA
recommends they be included in the PRSD category. This
section is entirely new and was created for ease of
comparison between the IOA and NASA _s. All of the QD
and cap failure modes were grouped into this section because
they were in a couple analysis section groupings.
J
I
z
m
l
mm
mm
mm
I
i
!
mm
I
l
m
g
I
28 D
g
mL
5
w
m
=
w
w
u
!
w
%
r_
i
l
L
u
r
5 • 0 REFERENCE8
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
I. JSC-12820, STS Operational Flight Rules, Final, 12-16-
85.
2' _ SpaceShuttle Ope_ationS_andMaintenanceReq uirements
and Specification Document (OMRSD), V. 45 File III,
Orbiter OMRSD - Electrical Power Generation/Power
Reactant Storage and Distribution, 5-29-86.
3. VS70-945099, Integrated System Schematic, Electrical
Power System (EPS), Orbiter Vehicles - 099, 103 & 104,
Rev. AO8, 7-18-85.
o VS70-945102, Integrated System Schematic, Orbiter OV-
102, EPS, Rev. G04, 6-19-84.
. Mission Operations Directorate, Systems Analysis
Section, Training Guide, Space Shuttle Electrical Power
System, Basic, 6-28-85.
. JSC-19935, Environmental Systems Console Handbook,
Volumes 1 & 2, Systems Division, Electrical and
Environmental Systems Branch, Basic, Rev. A, 10-15-85.
.
Rockwell International, Reliability Desk Instruction
No. 100-2G, Flight Hardware FMEA & CIL, 1-31-84.
o NASA-JSC Orbiter Power Reactant Storage and
Distribution Subsystem Handbook, Third Edition, 10-84.
.
JSC-10506, Flight Operations Directorate Drafting
Standards, Revision B, 9-79.
I0.
ii.
JSC 12830, EGIL Console Procedures Handbook, Rev. C,
10-83.
Rockwell International, Numerical Index of
Specifications Released at Space Systems Group, No.
MA0501-I027, 1-28-84.
12.
13.
NASA Reference Publication 1113, Design Guide for High
Pressure Oxygen Systems, 8-83.
JSC TD-128, Electrical Power System Workbook, EPS 2102,
8-20-82.
14. Rockwell International, SD 74-SH-0026-1, Subsystem
Certification Plan, Power Reactant Storage and
Distribution, 4-75.
15. JSC TD268, Shuttle Flight Operations Manual, Vol. 2,
29
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Electrical Power Systems, 11-28-84.
JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Vol. i,
Rev. C, DCN-5, 9-13-85.
JSC-08934, Shuttle Operational Data Book, Vol. i, Rev.
D, 10-84.
JSC-18691, Flight Data File, Malfunctio n Procedures,
All Vehicle, Basic, Rev. B, 10-10-85.
JSC-18538, Flight Data File, Orbit Pocket Checklist,
All Vehicle, Basic, Rev. _, 3-5-85.
JSC-18537, Flight Data File, Ascent Pocket Checklist,
All Vehicle, Basic, Rev. A, 5-24-85.
JSC-18539, Flight Data File, Entry Pocket Checklist,
All Vehicle, Basic, Rev. A, 5-24-85.
JSC-18547, Flight Data File, Ascent Checklist, Basic,
Rev. A, 5-28-85.
Report M4001002, JSC Orbiter Full Problem Record (FPR),
Electrical Power Generation Subsystem, 7-22-86.
Rockwell International Specifications for PRSD
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
J.
k.
MC276-0010, Disconnect, Cryogenic Fluid, Rev. F,
7"18-80.
MC276-0012, Disconnect, Gas Supply, Rev. C. 3-24-
77.
MC282-0063, Storage Assembly, Power Reactant -
Orbiter, Rev, H, _4-82. ....
MC284-0429, Valve, Shutoff, Unidirectional and
Bi-directional 02 and H2, Rev. B. 10-30-75,
MC284-0440, Valve, Pressure Relief, Cryogenic,
Rev. C, 5-14-79.
MC286-0054, Filter, Cryogenic, Rev. A, 9-17-75.
MC449-0185, Sensor, Control Pressure, Rev. E, 2-
01-79.
MC999-0097, Metallic Pressure Vessel, Space
Shuttle Orbiter, Requirements for, Rev. C, ii-i0-
75.
ME273-0074, Coupling, Half, Quick Disconnect,
Female Fitting, Rev. F, 7-21-75.
ME273-0075, Coupling, Half, Quick Disconnect, Male
Fitting, Rev. F, 7-10-75.
ME284-0281, Valve, Solenoid, Latching, Rev. J. ii-
1-74.
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VL70-008517, Electrical Power Subsystem - Intru-
Schematic, Rev. E, 3-7-74.
VO70-454314, Panel - Hydrogen Control, LH Side,
Assy. of, Rev. A, 1-27-76.
VO70-454315, Panel-Oxygen Control, LH Side, Assy.
of, Rev. A, 2-20-76.
VO70-454374, Panel - H2 Pressure Relief, PRSD,
Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, 4-14-75.
VO70-454377, Panel - 02 Pressure Relief, PRSD
Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, 4-14-75.
VO70-454388, Panel - H2 Pressure Relief,
Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev. B. 1-
14-82.
VO70-454389, Panel - 02 Pressure Relief,
Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev. D, 8-
27-81.
VO70-454410, Panel - Oxygen Control, RH Side,
Assy. of, 4-3-75.
VO70-454411, Panel - Hydrogen Control, RH Side,
Assy. of, 4-3-75.
VO70-454710, Panel - Oxygen Control, LH Side,
Assy. of, Rev. E, 3-12-82.
V070-454712, Braze & Insulation - H2 Control
Valves & Components, LH Side, Assy. of, Rev. C,
4-17-79.
VO70-454714, Panel - Oxygen Control, RH Side,
Assy. of, Rev. F, 10-8-82.
VO70-454716, Braze & Insulation - H2 Control
Valves & Components, RH Side, Assy. of, Rev. E, 4-
86.
VO70-454898, Electrical Power Substation, LH
Installation, Xo693 to Xo919, Rev. B, 12-85.
VO70-454899, Electrical Power Subsystem
Instl-RH Side, Xo693 to Xo 919, Rev. B, 12-10-82.
VS70-458678, PRSD 102 & Subs, Schematic, Rev. A,
11-7-79.
V525-454158, Panel - Tank Set 4, H2 Pressure
Relief, Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev.
C, 7-9-84.
V525-454161, Panel - Tank Set 4, 02 Pressure
Relief, Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev.
E, 7-6-84.
V544-454137, Panel - Tank Set 3, 02 Pressure
Relief, Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev.
A, 7-29-80.
V544-454155, Panel - Tank Set 3, H2 Pressure
Relief, Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev.
B, 7-9-84.
26. MDAC IOA EPG/PRSD Working Paper No. 1.0-WP-VA86001-11,
12-12-86.
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27.
28.
Rockwell International, STS82-0026, Orbiter Vehicle
Operational Configuration, Failure Mode Effects
Analysis, Electrical Power Subsystem, January 28, 1983
(Change #2).
NASA-JSC FMEAs and CIL, 3-18-87.
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ACRONYMS
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AOA
ARPCS
Assy
ATO
CI
CIL
CRIT
CRYO
C&W
ECLSS
EGIL
EPG
EPS
F
FCP
FMEA
GFE
GSE
HOLCF
HR
HRVFP
H2
HVM
HW
IOA
JSC
LB
LH
MDAC
MECO
MPS
NASA
NSTS
NA
OMRSD
OMS
ORVFP
02
OVM
PCI
PLS
PRCB
PRSD
psi
psig
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Abort Once Around
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem
Assembly
Abort To Orbit
Critical Item
Critical Items List
Criticality
Cryogenic
Caution and Warning System
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Electrical, General Instrumentation, and Lighting
Engineer
Electrical Power Generation
Electrical Power System
Functional
Fuel Cell Powerplant
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Government Furnished Equipment
Ground Support Equipment
H2 & 02 Lines, Components, and Fittings
Hour
Hydrogen Relief Valve/Filter Package
Hydrogen
Hydrogen Valve Module
Hardware
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Pound
Left Hand
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Main Engine Cutoff
Main Propulsion Subsystem
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Not Applicable
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and
Specification Document
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
Oxygen Relief Valve/Filter Package
Oxygen
Oxygen Valve Module
Potential Critical Item
Primary Landing Site
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge
A-I
QD
QDCAP
Rev
RH
RI
RTLS
STS
TAL
T-O
Xo
m
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ACRONYMS
Quick Disconnect
H2 & 02 Fill and Vent QDs, Horizontal Drain QDs,
GSE_F_II T-O QDs and their caps
Revision
Right Hand
Rockwell International _ -
Return to Landing Site
Space Transportation System
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Time Zero
X Axis of Orbiter
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APPENDIX B
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B.1
B.2
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Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
m
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECT$_RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE _MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
pHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE -_begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition_6ut-of-OPS_l ....(Syn0n_6uS_with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
_touchd0wn and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, _ ASSUMPTIONS
u
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
p_eparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
I
D
io
•
•
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FME /CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FME s are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NsTs 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
.....ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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DEFINITION8 o GROUND RULE8 • AND _8UNPTZON8
B.3 EPG/PRSD - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
I.
•
•
Component age life will not be considered in the analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age life analysis is beyond the
scope of this task.
cryogenic system pressure tO the fuel cell will be assumed
lost if unable to maintain minimum supply conditions of 100
PSI for H2 and/or 02 tanks.
RATIONALE: Minimum requirements definition. Flight
rule definition.
An 02 cry. tank will be assumed lost if both of its heaters
fail to function (i.e., neither heater will function with
the delta current sensors enabled).
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
definition.
Flight rule
• An H2 cry. tank will be assumed lost if neither of its
•heaters will function•
_TIONALE: Systems failure definition.
definition.
Flight rule
• An impending loss of all cry. 02 or all cry. H2 tanks will
be cause to exercise the highest-priority abort mode the
loss/leak will allow.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition.
6. Continue nominal ascent if 2/3/4 02 (H2) tanks fail when
flying 3/4/5,
Enter next PLS daily go/no-go if two 02 (H2) tanks fail
during lift-off and on-orbit.
RATIONALE: Flight rules go/no-go criteria.
• Ascent abort decision will be needed for any EPG/PRSD/FCP
problems that will not support four hours on-orbit plus
entry time.
RATIONALE: Flight operations rules.
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A fuel cell will be considered failed if the following
conditions exist.
Re An abnormal or unexplained voltage versus current
performance loss of _0.5 volts for a single FC based on
predicted performance data.
b.
C.
Coolant pump or H2 pump/H20 separator is lost.
Fuel cell stack-c0olant temperature >255 degrees
(242.5) degrees F or <175 degrees (182.5) degrees F.
d. Coolant pressure >75 (71.4) PSIA and increasing.
e. Fuel cell unable to discharge water to the ECLSS H20
storage tanks or overboard via the fuel cell H20
relief system.
f.
.
h.
Local KOH Concentration >48 percent (45 percent) dry or
<24 percent (29 percent) wet as indicated by fuel cell
stack-coolant temperature, condenser exit temperature,
and current relationship.
Fuel cell reactant valve fails closed.
Cannot be connected to a main bus.
i.
J.
Fuel cell H20 pH high confirmed.
Fuel cell 02 reaction chambers cannot be purged.
k. Fuel cell end-cell heater failing on.
I. Fuel cell substack delta volts >150 millivolts and
increasing.
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
. Loss of one fuel cell is considered cause for priority
flight and_abo_ decision.
RATIONALE: Mission flight rule definition.
10. Loss of two fuel cells is considered cause for abort
mission.
RATIONALE: Contingency action summary.
definition.
Flight Rule
ii. Loss of three fuel cells is considered loss of life/vehicle
in all mission phases.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition.
B-7
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Loss of two fuel cells in the first stage of ascent is
considered loss of life/vehicle.
RATIONALE: SRB loads are too high for one fuel cell to
support. Voltage may go <25v which will
shut down the GPCs.
Although the ECLSS product-water storage is a separate
system from EPG, it will be considered as a failable
redundant product-water relief line for purposes of the EPG
functional criticality scenarios.
RATIONALE: This assumption violates general ground
rule 3.1.1.6 but is essential for
evaluating failures associated with the
water relief line.
Filter failure will only be considered in the case of total
flow blockage. Cases of improper/insufficient filtering
will not be considered except where obvious.
RATIONALE: The effect of "poor' filter performance on
downstream components is beyond the scope
of our efforts.
The start/sustaining heater on the left-hand FCP (FCP #i) is
assumed to be disconnected. Thus, this FCP cannot be
maintained operational at no-load, and will be considered
shutdown if the load cannot be maintained at greater than 2
KW.
RATIONALE: Load needed to maintain operating
temperature. RH FCP uses sustaining heater
to maintain temperatures at no-load.
For all "failed open" failure modes for valves which are
normally open, redundancy screen B will be assumed failed.
RATIONALE: The failure is not detectable until the valve
is required to be closed.
Five 02 and H2 tanks are being used as the baseline
configuration under study.
RATIONALE: The configuration for all redundant components
is being considered for this analysis.
Inadvertent Fuel Cell shutdown during RTLS and TAL abort is
considered loss of crew/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Loss of FCP 1/Bus K is loss of OMS Engine
Purge Capability (required for TAL) and Aft
Compartment MPS Helium Purge Capability
(required for RTLS and TAL).
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19. Inadvertent Fuel Cell shutdown during RTLS and TAL abort is
considered loss of crew/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Loss of FCP 1/Bus A is loss of OMS Engine
Purge Capability (required for TAL) and Aft
Compartment MPS Helium Purge Capability
(required for RTLS and TAL).
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED lt_SESB](ENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
- NASA FMEA/CIL
- BaSeline With Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X - Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N - Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-200
NASA FMEA #: M4-182-PD030-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MD_C ID_
ITS:
QD'S (5)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
200 ......
H2 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK DISCONNECT (4) & VENT
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
A_O NASA _EA'S 04-1B-PD030-1 AND M4-1BI-PD030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAI_ OPEN OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
RETENTION RATIONA_ IS NOT AVAILABLE. IF THE CAP A_O LEAKED,
H2 COULD ACCUMULATE IN THE MID FUSELAGE AND POSSIBLY RESULT IN AN
EXP_SION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-201
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
QD'S (5)
EPG
201
H2 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK DISCONNECT (4) & VENT
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ....................
THE FMEAs _DID NOT INCLUDE THiS FA_LURE°MODE _ _NAB_fLITY TO
MATE/DEMATE). FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER
WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-202
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-PC030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
202
H2 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL AND VENT QD CAPS (9)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA E 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
EX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
mm
U
I
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J
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-PC030-1 AND M4-1BI-PC030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. BECAUSE THE QD HAS AN
ALLOWABLE LEAK RATE, THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN THE
ACCUMULATION OF H2 IN THE ORBITER MID FUSELAGE AND A POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 13 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
PRSD-203
M4-1B2-MT030-1
EPG
203
H2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-iB-MT030-1_AND M4-1BI-MT030-1. •
THE FAILURE MODE IS FULL OUTPUT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-204
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-NT030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG _ i=
204
H2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT030-1 AND M4-1B1-MT030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FULL OUTPUT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
PRSD-205
M4-1B2-MT030-1
EPG
205
H2 TAN*< PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT030-1 AND M4-1BI-MT030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FULL.......OUTPUT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-206
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT039-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 2O6
ITEM: H2 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
A_ONASA _A_S_04UiB-MT039"IANDq_UlBI'MT039"I_ .... i
THE FAILURE MODE IS FULL OUTPUT. THIS NASA FAILURE MODE IS LOSS
OF OUTPUT INCLUDING ERRONEOUS SIGNAL. THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE
INADEQUATE H2 SUPPLY PRESSURE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-207
NASA FMEA # : M4-1B2-MT039-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 207
ITEM: H2 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT039-1 AND M4-1BI-MT039-1.
THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS ZERO OUTPUT. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE MODE
IS LOSS OF OUTPUT INCLUDING ERRONEOUS SIGNAL. THE TANK COULD
RUPTURE STARTING 35 HOURS AFTER TANK RESIDUAL LEVEL IS REACHED.
THE OFF POSITION OF THE SWITCH IS A REDUNDANCY. IF THE
HEATERS OF BOTH TANKS 1 AND 2 OR 3 AND 4 ARE SELECTED TO THE
AUTOMATIC MODE, THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/IR, BECAUSE THEIR TANK
SENSOR LOGIC WOULD BE CONNECTED, AND BOTH TANK PAIR'S SENSORS
WOULD HAVE TO FAIL. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A SEPARATE FMEA BE
WRITTEN FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BECAUSE ITS EFFECT IS VASTLY
DIFFERENT FROM A FAILURE OF FULL OUTPUT.
REPORT DATE 2/25/88 C-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-208
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT039-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
208
H2 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ I/I ] [ P ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA _'S 04-1B-MT039-1 AND M4-1BI-MT039-1.
THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE
MODE IS LOSS OF OUTPUT INCLUDING ERRONEOUS SIGNAL. THIS COULD
CAUSE A RANGE OFRESULTS FRO_AC_2 P_$S_BEING TOO LOW TO
REACTANT DEPLETIbN _DATANK_RU__ARTING _HOURS
RESIDUAL LEVEL IS REACHED. SENSOR READINGS NEAR ZERO COULD CAUSE
THE TANK HEATERS TO BE ON IF THE HEATERS OF BOTH TANKS 1 AND 2,
OR 3 AND 4ARE SELECTED TO THE AUT_O_TIC MODE. THE REDUNDANT
PATH IS PUTTING THE HEATER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION.
I
I
mm
ms
U
B
mm
D.
m
I
mm
REPORT DATE 2/25/88 C-10
u
rE
mm
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WO_HEET
l
1
L =
1
m
m
= =
1
1
1
1
= -
1
B
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-209
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEMENT B (5)
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
209
H2 TANK HEATER ELEMENT A (5), H2 TANK HEATER
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT. THE FAILURE MODE
IS FAILS ON. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MDAC FMEA BE DELETED
SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE IS REALLY ONLY AN EFFECT THAT IS THE
RESULT OF THE HEATER SWITCH FAILING ON. THIS FAILURE IS
COVERED IN THE MDAC EPD&C/PRSD ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-210
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEMENT B (5)
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
210
H2 TANK HEATER ELEMENT A (5), H2 TANK HEATER
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/1R] [P]
[ ] C ] [
[P] CP] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
REcoMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT. THE FAILURE MODE
IS FAILS OFF. INOPERATIVE HEATERS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF H2 PRESSURE
TO THE FUEL CELLS ....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-211
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV030-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
211
H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (4)-RV030,RV040,RV500,RV560
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S: 04-1B-RV030-1 FOR H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (2) -
RV030, RV040 AND M4-1BI-RV030-1 FOR H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (3) -
RV030, RV040, RV500. THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL
LEAKAGE. SCREEN B_SHOULD B_ NA pER NSTS 22206 SECTION
2.3.4. b. 2. a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. THE
HARDWARE CRITICALITY
SHOULD BE A 3 FOR GREATER THAN TWO TANK SETS. CHANGING THIS
WOULD ALLOW DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-212
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
M4-1B2-RV030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
212
H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (4)-RV030,RVO40,RV500,RV560
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S: 04-1B-RV030-2 FOR H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (2)
RV030, RV040 AND M4-1B1-RV030-2 FOR H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (3)
RV030, RV040, RV500. THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED CLOSED. IF THE
SAME TANKtS CHECK VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD
OCCUR DUE TO CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE TANK. SCREEN B IS
NA PER_NSTS 2_06 S_TION 2.3,4.b.2.a. BECAUSE THE RELf_F
VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-213
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPG
213
H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (4)-RV030,RV040,RVS00,RV560
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S: 04-1B-AOIFSH-i FOR H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (2) -
RV030, RV040 AND M4-1BI-AOiFSH_IRFOR H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (3) -
RV030, RV040, RV500o THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA
COVERED THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND
SINCE THE EFFECT IS THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-214
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-VP035-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
214
H2 RELIEF PORT 1 (1)
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
u
l
Z
m
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Im
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-VP035-1 AND M4-1BI-VP035-1.
THE FAILURE MODE =IS RESTRICTED FLOW_ iFA CHECK VALVEFOR TANK
I, 2, OR 4 ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO
CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE TANK. SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA
PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.4.b.2.a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF PORT
IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
mm
l
mm
mm
l
I
E
U
i
U
REPORT DATE 2/25/88 C-16 U
B
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
L
u
u
L_
:
m
w
w
u
w
m
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
PRSD-215
M4-1B2-VP045-1
EPG
215
H2 RELIEF PORT 2 (1)
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [N] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CiL
ITEM
[X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-VP045-1. THE FAILURE MODE IS RESTRICTED
FLOW. SCREEN B S_OULD BE NA PER N_TS 22206 SECTION 2.3.4.b.2.a.
BECAUSE THE RELIEF PORT IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 2. IF A CHECK VALVE FOR TANK 3 OR 5 ALSO
FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO CONDUCTIVE HEAT
TRANSFER INTO THE TANK.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-216
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-TK030-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
216
H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (4), (3), OR (2)
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-TK030-1 AND M4-1BI-TK030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE ISEXTERNAL_GE. PER NSTS22206 SECTION
2.3.3.h., A SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A
CRITICALITY I/!, THE NEW FMEA REVIEW COMBINED THE FAILURE ....
MODES OF EXTE_AL LEAKAGE AND RUPTURE INTO ONE FMEA. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT A SEPARATE FMEA BE WRITTEN ON THIS FAILURE MODE
AND ITEM PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.1.A.I.
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ASSESSME_ DA_,:2/IV/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-217
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-TK030-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
217
H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (4),
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
(3), OR (2)
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-TK030-1 AND M4-IBI-TK030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS RUPTURE.
ix]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-218
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-TK030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
218
H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (4), (3), OR (2)
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COHPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE ['X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO FMEA NASA'S 04-1B-TK030-2 AND M4-1BI-TK030-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS LOSS OF ANNULUS VACUUM. THE REACTANT COULD
BE DEPLETED DURING RE-ENTRY DUE TO EXCESSIVE HEATING, AND THIS
COULD LOSE THE ORBITER.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-219
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45T21 (-5) 07A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
EPG
219
H2 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FME s DID NOT INCLUDE THIS FAILURE MODE (FULL OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-220
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45T21(-5)07A
EPG
220
H2 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEAs DID NOT INCLUDE THIS FAILURE MODE (ZERO OUTPUT) OR:x
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-221
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45T21 (-5) 07A
EPG
221
H2 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (OUT OF TOLERANCE) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-222
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4)01A
EPG _ _
222
H2 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5) V45T21(-
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARY_ : .....
THERE IS NO FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (FULL OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-223
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4)01A
EPG
223
H2 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5) V45T21(-
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] C ] [ ]
C NA] C NA] C NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (ZERO OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-224
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4)01A
EPG
224
H2 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5) V45T21(-
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (OUT OF TOLERANCE) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-225
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
225
H2 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45Q21(-5) 05A
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [
[ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
_4
= :
H
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (FULL 0UTPUT) OR
C0_NENT. F6_cOMPLE_E_S,_A_A MAY WANT TOCONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-226
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
226
H2 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45Q21 (-5) 05A
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
I
I
I
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
......... _DEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (ZERO OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-227
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPG
227
H2 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45Q21(-5)05A
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO FMEA FOR THIS FAILUREMODE (OUT OF TOI_RANCE) OR
COMPONENT, FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-228
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
228
H2 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
oo
i
|
mS
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEAIS 04-1B-A01FSH-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSH-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL
THE COMPONENTS COVERED BY THIS FMEA BE LISTED IN IT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-229
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
= :
EPG
229
H2 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
]
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / J c c J E ]" [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS NO FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). THIS
FAILURE_CO_D RESULT IN _TING _DOWN THE FUEL CEL_ DUE TO LACK
OF H2. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MDAC FMEA BE DELETED SINCE
THIS FAILURE MODE IS NON-CREDIBLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-230
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-FL030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
230
H2 FILTER (4) FL030,FL040,FL500,FL560
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[N]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ]' C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
..... ADEQUATE [ X ]
...... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S: 04-I-FL030-1 FOR H2 FILTER (2) - FL030, FL040
AND M4-1B-FLO30-I FOR H2 _LTER (3_ _ FL030, FL_/ FL040.
THE FAILURE MODE IS RESTRICTED FLOW. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS
A 2 BECAUSE IF THE SAME TANK'S RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED,
AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE
TANK.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-231
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM."
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
231
H2 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (I) RV031
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA_'S04-1B-RV03!-I_D_M4-!B%_RVQ3_I _............
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE CIL
RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY
SHOULD BE A 3. SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA PER NSTS 22206 SECTION
2.3.4.b.2.a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
NOT FAILING SCREEN B WOULD ALLOW THIS TO BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-232
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV031-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
232
H2 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV03!
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] IN] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[. / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV031-2 AND M4-1BI-RV031-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. SCREEN B IS NA PER NSTS 22206
SECTION 2.3.4.b. 2.a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY
REDUNDANT . ........... _ _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-233
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
233
H2 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (1) RV031
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSH-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT iD: PRSD-234
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV031-1
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
EPG
234
H2 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV041
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ N A] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
RE_%RKS: INADEQUATE [ X ]
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV031-1 AND M4-1BI-RV031-1r-_Ii _::-_ _ .....
THE FAILURE _[O_DEIS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE CIL
RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY
SHOULD BE A 3. SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA PER NSTS 22206 SECTION
2.3.4.B.2.A. BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
FAILING SCREEN B WOULD ALLOW THIS TO BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
I
m
mm
m
n
mR
u
HI
j [
m
m
U
u
u
=-_
mm ,
REPORT DATE 2/25/88 C-36
m
mm
z
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
L
w
w
w
w
E_
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-235
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV031-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
235
H2 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (I) RV041
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV031-2 AND M4-1BI-RV031-2.
_THE FAI_ MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. SCREEN B iS NA PER NSTS 22206
SECTION 2.3.4.b.2.a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY
REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-236
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [_ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
236
H2 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (I) RV041
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If@pplicgble) _ ........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S04-1B-A01FSHTIANDM4-1BI-A01FSH-I .... _ _
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-237
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
237
H2 CHECK VALVE (2) CV031,CV041
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-CV030-1 FOR H2 CHECK VALVE _03i.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
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l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-238
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV030-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
238
H2 CHECK VALVE (2) CV031,CV041
ASSESSMENT:
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-CV030-2 FOR H2 CHECK VALVE CV031. THE
FAILURE MODE IS FAILS C_SED OR RESTRICTED FLOW. mE _DWARE _
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 2 BECAUSE IF THE SAME TANK'S RELIEF VALVE
ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO CONDUCTIVE
HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE TANK. THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
COVERING THE OTHER H2 CHECK VALVE FOR THIS FAILURE MODE IS PRSD-
241.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-239
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
239
H2 CHECK VALVE (2) CV031,CV041
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REM_AKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-A01FSH-I FOR H2 CHECK VALVE CV031.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-240
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV030-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
240
H2 CHECK VALVE (1) CV030
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
mm
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m
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DEL_.TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-CV030-1 AND M4-1BI-CV030-1. - ....
THE FA_MODE IS ?AI_D OPENOR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE :
HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-241
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
241
H2 CHECK VALVE (i) CV030
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
i
V
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / _] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEAIS 04-1B-CV030-2 AND M4-1BI-CV030-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED CLOSED OR RESTRICTED FLOW. THE
HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IF THE SAME TANK'S RELIEF
VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO
CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE TANK. THE RETENTION
RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-242
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
EPG
242
H2 CHECK VALVE (1) CV030
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: .....
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-1 AND M4-1BI-A01FSH-1 ...........
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-243
NASA FMEA # : M4-1B2-CV030-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
243
H2 CHECK VALVE (i) CV040
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-CV030-1 AND M4-1BI-CV030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
PRSD-244
M4-1B2-CV030-2
EPG
244
H2 CHECK VALVE (1) CV040
B. E. AMES
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC C _
CIL
ITEM
A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
l
I
w
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m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE) -
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEAWS 04-1B-CV030-2 AND M4-1BI-CV030-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED OR RESTRICTED FLOW. THE
HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IF THE SAME TANK'S RELIEF
VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO
CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE TANK. THE RETENTION
RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-245
NASA FMEA #: M4-1BI-A01FSH-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
245
H2 CHECK VALVE (i) CV040
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
im
+_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
...._ +:_ ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-1 AND M4-1B1-A01FSH-1.
THE FAILUREMODE IS EXTERNAL+_AKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-246
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-PD032-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
246
H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (I) TYPE II, CLASS 8
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS-
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-PD032-1 AND M4-1BI-PD032-1.
THE FAILURE-_ IS _AL LE_E. _ CIL RETENTION
RATTONA_ IS NOT AVAILAB_.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
PRSD-247
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
EPG
247
H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (i) TYPE II, CLASS 8
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE AFMEA ON THIS FAiLURE MODE (INABILITY TO
MATE/DEMATE) FOR THIS COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT
TO CONSIDER WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-248
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-PC030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
248
H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN CAP (I)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-PC030-1 AND M4-1BI-PC030-1
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEDGE. BECAUSE THE QD HAS AN
ALLOWABLE LEAK RATE, THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN THE
ACCUMULATION OF H2 IN THE ORBITER MID FUSELAGE AND A POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-249
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
M4-1B2-MT032-1
EPG
249
H2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
B. E. AMES
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
[ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT032-1 AND M4-1BI-MT032-1.
THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS FULL OUTPUT. THE NASA FAILURE MODE IS
LOSS OF OUTPUT OR ERRONEOUS SIGNAL.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
PRSD-250
M4-1B2-MT032-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
250
H2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT032-1 AND M4-1BI-MT032-1.
THE IOA FAiL_ MODE IS ZERO 0UTPUT. THE NASA FAILURE MODE IS
LOSS OF OUTPUT OR ERRONEOUS SIGNAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-251
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT032-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
251
H2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT032-1 AND M4-1BI-MT032-1.
THE IOAFAILURE MODE IS_OUT_oFT0_CE. THE NASA FAILURE MODE
IS LOSS OF OUTPUT OR ERRONEOUS SIGNAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-252
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
252
H2 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (I) LV031
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. _S
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
[D]
(ADD/DELETE)
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/ ] [ ] [P] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
_ INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS-
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV031-1 AND M4-1BI-LV031-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BE CHANGED TO A 3. IF
THE TANK 1 RELIEF VALVE AND MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN,
ALL REACTANT COULD BE_D OUT THE RELIEF PORT. ISOLATING
THE LEAK BY _rSING LV041 COULD STILL SHUTDOWN FUEL CEL_S 1 AND
3. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF LINES AND COMPONENTS IS NOT INCLUDED AS
AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE BECAUSE NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.3.h. ALREADY
DEFINES THiS_S_A CRITICALITY i/i. SCREEN B SHOULD BE
PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE WITH THE VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. THIS WOULD ALLOW
REMOVAL OF THIS FAILURE MODE FROM THE CIL. THE RETENTION
RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-253
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV031-2
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
253
H2 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV031
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NAS_A)"
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV031-2 AND M4-1BI-LV031-2....... FOR 04-1B-
LV031-2 NASA'S CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC: 2/IR. THE FAILURE
MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE VALVE IS USED FOR LEAK ISOLATION AND
AS A REDUNDANT PRESSURE RELIEF PATH. FOR A TWO TANK SET SYSTEM,
THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY WOULD BE A 2 DURING ASCENT BECAUSE TWO
FUEL CELLS COULD BE LOST IF THE TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE FAILED
OPEN. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3 FOR GREATER THAN
TWO TANK SETS, BECAUSE AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR IF A TANK'S
RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED AND HEATERS FAIL ON. THIS DOES NOT
MEET THE CRITERIA TO BE A CIL ITEM, AND SHOULD BE
DELETED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-254
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
EPG _ _
254
H2 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (I) LV031
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-1 AND M4-1BI-A01FSH-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL.
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE _A, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-255
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV033
EPG
255
H2 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ) [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-1 AND M4-1BI-LV033-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE, THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IT WILL ONLY TAKE A FUEL CELL FAILURE
REQUIRING FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN, PLUS A FAILURE OF THE REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVES TO CAUSE THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ORBITER.
SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE
THERE IS A VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE
IS NOT AVAILABLE.
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-256
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV033
EPG
256
H2 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-2 AND M4-1BI-LV033-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 2/IR
FOR THE ONORBIT PHASE ALSO BECAUSE LOSS OF A FUEL CELL CAUSES A
PRIORITy FLIGHT DECISION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-257
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV033
EPG
257 .....
H2 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CiL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-I AND M4"IBi&A01FSH-I,
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-258
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
(i) LV043
EPG
258
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-1 AND M4-1BI-LV033-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IT WILL ONLY TAKE A FAILURE REQUIRING
FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN, PLUS A FAILURE OF THE REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
TO CAUSE THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ORBIt. SCREEN B SHOULD
BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS A
VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT
AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-259
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV043
EPG
259
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST : B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-2 AND M4-1BI-LV033-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 2/IR
FOR THE ONORBIT PHASE ALSO, BECAUSE LOSS OF A FUEL CELL CAUSES A
PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-260
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV043
EPG
260
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSH-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERS THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-261
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV044
EPG
261
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [F] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [N] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] _ [p] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-1 AND M4"iBi-LV0J3"I' _
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IT WILL ONLY TAKE A FAILURE REQUIRING
FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN, PLUS A FAILURE OF THE REACTANT SUPPLY VALVES
TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF _ ORBITER. SCREEN B SHOULD
BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS A
VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT
AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-262
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV044-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV044
EPG
262
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-LV044-2. _ _
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 2/IR
FOR THE ONORBIT PHASE ALSO, BECAUSE LOSS OF A FUEL CELL CAUSES A
PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-263
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV044
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
263
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
w
M
I
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSH-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-264
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
264
H2 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV041
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
I
I
I
I
I
im
b
L
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV031-1 AND M4-1BI-LV031-1.
THE FAILURE MO_iS FAi_0P_EN 0R _-I_ERNAL LEA_GE. IT IS _ _
RECOMMENDED THAT THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BE CHANGED TO A 3. IF
THE TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE AND MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN,
ALL REACTANT COULD BE DEPLETED OUT THE RELIEF PORT. ISOLATING
THE LEAK BY CLOSING LV031 WOULD STILL SHUTDOWN FUEL CELLS 2 AND
3. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF LINES AND COMPONENTS IS NOT INCLUDED AS
AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE BECAUSE NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.3.h. ALREADY
DEFINES THIS AS A CRITICALITY I/i. SCREEN B SHOULD BE
PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE WITH THE VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. THIS WOULD ALLOW
REMOVAL OF THIS FAILURE MODE FROM THE CIL. THE RETENTION
RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
PRSD-265
M4-1B2-LV031-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
EPG
265
H2 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV041
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC
COMPARE [ /N ]
A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
m
M
i
m
u
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV031-2 AND M4-1BI-LV031-2. FOR 04-1B-
LV031-2 NASA'S CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC: 2/IR. THE
FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE VALVE IS USED FOR LEAK
ISOLATION AND AS A REDUNDANT PRESSURE RELIEF PATH. FOR A TWO
TANK SET SYSTEM, THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY WOULD BE A 2 DURING
ASCENT BECAUSE TWO FUEL CELLS COULD BE LOST IF THE TANK 1
RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3
FOR GREATER THAN TWO TANK SETS, BECAUSE AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR
IF A TANK'S RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED AND HEATERS FAIL ON. THIS
DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA TO BE A CIL ITEM, AND SHOULD BE
DELETED.
u_
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-266
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
266
H2 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV041
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
m
m
mm
m
mm
m
,,m
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] i ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSH-I .........
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
i
B
[]
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-267
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV045-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
267
H2 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV045
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
coMP [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ P ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
_ INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV045-1 AND M4-1BI-LV045-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT
AVAILABLE. SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION
2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS A VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. PASSING
SCREEN B WOULD ALLOW THIS TO BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
u
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-268
NASA FMEA # : M4-1B2-LV045-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
268
H2 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV045
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
c ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV045-2 AND M4-1B1-LV045-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. :
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-269
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSH-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM. "
EPG
269
H2 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV045
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ I /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSH-I AND M4-1B1-A01FSH-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-270
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-PD035-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PD035
EPG
270
H2 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-0 QUICK DISCONNECT (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/ mc
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA _A_SO4£1B'PD035-i _D M4-iB1-PD035-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE MODE
IS FAILS OPEN. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3. THE
RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
I
I
m
I
mm
mm
m
I
i
m
M
mm
m
B
E
mm
L_
B_
ms
I
REPORT DATE 2/25/88 C-72 I
h
wurn-
L_J
w
w
W
w
w
L_
lure •
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-271
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PD035
LEAD ANALYST:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
EPG _
271
H2 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-O QUICK DISCONNECT (i)
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
,L
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[3/3
(If different from NASA)
] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (INABILITYTO
MATE/DEMATE) FOR THIS COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT
TO CONSIDER WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-272
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV010-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
272
02 CHECK VALVE (i) CV010
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CP]
[P]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
CX]
CN]
m
l
me
m
m
m
i
mR
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-CV010-1 AND M4-1BI-CV010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3.
C ]
[ ]
THE HARDWARE
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-273
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV010-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
273
02 CHECK VALVE (I) CV010
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-CV010-2 AND M4-1BI-CV010-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS C_I_I _OR RESTRICTED FLOW. THE
HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IF THE SAME TANK'S RELIEF
VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO
CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE TANK. THE RETENTION
RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
L
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-274
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
274
02 CHECK VALVE (i) CV010
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
ms
ms
um
um
m
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
PRSD-275
M4-1B2-LV015-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
275
02 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV015
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV015-1 AND M4-1BI-LV015-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT
AVAILABLE SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION
2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS A VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. PASSING
SCREEN B WOULD ALLOW THIS TO BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-276
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV015-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
276
02 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV015
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
z
I
m
ms
mm
g
b
D
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV015-2 AND M4-1BI-LV015-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. _
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT _D;_PRSD-277
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
277
02 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV015
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CILCRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
ITEM
C
[ NA] C X ] *
[ NA] [ X ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
.... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-278
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LVOI2-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LV012
EPG
278
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 1 SUPPLY VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS: ....
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LVOI2-1 AND M4-1BI-LV012-1_
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTE_AL _AKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3. SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS
22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS A VALVE POSITION
INDICATOR. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
PASSING SCREEN B WOULD ALLOW THIS TO BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-279
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV012-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LV012
EPG
279
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 1 SUPPLY VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [- ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEAIS 04-1B-LVOI2-2 AND M4-1BI-LV012-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE IOA AGREES THAT THE
HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS A 3. THE CREW HAS ENOUGH OXYGEN IN THE
CABIN FOR THEM TO SURVIVE A DEORBIT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-280
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LV012
EPG
280
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 1 SUPPLY VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-281
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LV022
EPG
281
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 2 SUPPLY VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ P ] C ] C D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV012-1 AND M4-1BI-LV012.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3. SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS
22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS A VALVE POSITION
INDICATOR. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
PASSING SCREEN B WOULD ALLOW THIS TO BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
u
REPORT DATE 2/25/88 C-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESS_ DATE: 2/17/88
_SESS_ ID: PRSD-282
NASA _ #: M4-1B2-LV012-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LV022
E_
282
02 SO_NOID ECT_qS SYSTEM 2 SUPPLY VAL_ (I)
T_AD _ALYST: B.E. _S
ASSESSMENT-.
_ITICALITY RED_D_CY SC_ENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
IT_
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL _TENTION _TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
__S:
A_0 NASA _A'S 04-1B-LV012-2 _D M4-1BI-LV0i2"2_ _ _ _
THE FAIL_ MODE IS FAI_ C_SED. _E IOA AGREES T_T THE
_DW_ CRITICALITY IS A 3. THE C_W MS ENOUGH OXYGEN IN THE
CABIN FOR _ TO S_VI_ A DEORBIT.
m
i
1
Ill
1
ill
mm
m
m
m
I
I
s
m
I
m
II
i
i
I
m
REPORT DATE 2/25/88 C-84
=
i
1
Ei !
i_
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
=
n
m
L
m
L_
r •
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-283
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LV022
EPG
283
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 2 SUPPLY VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
: ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO_I AND M4-1B1-A01FSO-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-284
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-PD015-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PD015
EPG
284
02 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-0 QUICK DISCONNECT (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-PD015-1 AND M4-1BI-PD015-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY
SHOULD BE A 3. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESS_NT DATE: 2/IV/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-285
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PD015
EPG
285 _
02 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-O QUICK DISCONNECT (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON _IS FAILURE MODE (INABILITY TO
MATE/DEMATE). FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER
WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-286
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT012-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
286
02 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
R
i
m-
E
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEAtS 04-1B-MT012-1 AND M4-1BI-MT012-1.
THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS FULL OUTPUT. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE MODE
IS LOSS OF OUTPUT OR ERRONEOUS SIGNAL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
PRSD-287
M4-1B2-MT012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
287
02 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
B. E. AMES
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT012-1 AND M4-1BI-MT012-1.
THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS ZERO OUTPUT. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE MODE
IS LOSS OF OUTPUT OR ERRONEOUS SIGNAL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-288
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT012-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
288
02 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
ASSESSMENT:
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT012-1 AND M4-1BI-MT012-1.
THE I0A FAILURE MODE IS OUT OF TOLE_CE. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE
MODE IS LOSS OF OUTPUT OR ERRONEOUS SIGNAL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-289
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LVOI3-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV013
EPG
289
02 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEAtS 04-1B-LV013-1 AND M4-1B1-LV013-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. SCREEN B
SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS
A VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT
AVAILABLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-290
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV013-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV013
EPG
290
02 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-2 AND M4-1BI-LV013-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A
2/IR FOR THE ONORBIT PHASE ALSO BECAUSE LOSS OF A FUEL CELL
CAUSES A PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-291
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV013
EPG
291
02 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVEP?ED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-292
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
•ITEM:
E_G _
292
02 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (I) LVOII
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
C ] CN] C ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[31 ] [ ] [P] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV011-1 AND M4-1BI-LV011-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BE CHANGED TO A 3. IF
THE TANK 1 RELIEF VALVE AND MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN,
ALL REACTANT COULD BE DEPLETED OUT THE RELIEF PORT. ISOLATING
THE LEAK BY C_SING LV021 WOU_ STILL S_DO_ _EL CELLS 1 AND
3, AND ECLSS SYSTEM I. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF LINES AND COMPONENTS
IS NOT INCLUDED AS AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE BECAUSE NSTS 22206
SECTION.3.3.h2 ALREADY DEFINESTHIS AS A CRITICALITY i/I.
SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE
THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE WITH THE VALVE POSITION INDICATOR.
THIS WOULD AL_W REMOVAL OF THIS FAILURE MODE FROM THE CIL. THE
RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-293
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
293
02 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV011
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
+ ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV011-2+AND M4,1BI+rLVQ!Ir2. FOR 04rlBn
LV031-2 NASA'S CRITICALITYFLIGHT HDW/FUNC: 2/IR. THE
FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE VALVE IS USED FOR LEAK
ISOLATION AND AS A REDUNDANT PRESSURE RELIEF PATH. FOR A TWO
TANK SET SYSTEM, THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY WOULD BE A 2 DURING
ASCENT BECAUSE TWO FUEL CELLS COULD BE LOST IF THE TANK 2 RELIEF
VALVE FAILED OPEN• THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3 FOR
GREATER THAN TWO TANK SETS, BECAUSE AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR IF A
TANK'S RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED AND HEATERS FAIL ON. THIS DOES
NOT MEET THE CRITERIA TO BE A CIL ITEM, AND SHOULD BE
DELETED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-294
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
294
02 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV011
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
D
z
U
D
U
U
U
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I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
PRSD-295
M4-1B2-LV011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
295
02 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV021
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] C ] [ N ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/ ] [ ] [P] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV011-1 AND M4-1BI-LV011-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BE CHANGED TO A 3. IF
THE TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE AND MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN,
ALL REACTANT COULD BE DEPLETED OUT THE RELIEF PORT. ISOLATING
THE LEAK BY CLOSING LV011 WOULD STILL SHUTDOWN FUEL CELLS 2 AND
3, AND ECLSS SYSTEM 2. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF LINES AND COMPONENTS
IS NOT INCLUDED AS AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE BECAUSE NSTS 22206
SECTION 2.3.3.h. ALREADY DEFINES THIS AS A CRITICALITY
I/i. SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a.
BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE WITH THE VALVE POSITION
INDICATOR. THIS WOULD ALLOW REMOVAL OF THIS FAILURE MODE FROM
THE CIL. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-296
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
296
02 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV021
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV011-2 AND M4-1BI-LV011-2. FOR 04-1B-
LV031-2 NASA'S CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC: 2/IR. THE
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE VALVE IS USED FOR LEAK
ISOLATION AND A_ A RED__ND__ P_SSURE RELIEF PATH. FOR A TWO
TANK SET SYSTEM, THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY WOULD BE A 2 DURING
ASCENT BECAUSE TWO FUEL CELLS COULD BE LOST IF THE TANK 1
RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3
FOR GREATER THAN TWO TANK SETS, BECAUSE AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR
IF A TANK'S RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED AND HEATERS FAIL ON. THIS
DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA TO BE A CIL ITEM, AND SHOULD BE
DELETED ....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-297
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
297
02 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV021
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA CoVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-298
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-PD025-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
298
02 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-PD025-1 AND M4-1BI-PD025-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS
NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-299
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPG
299
02 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (i)
B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
E ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] E N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (INABILITY TO
MATE/D_TE) FOR THIS C0MPONE-NT.F_COMP_TENESS. NASA MAY WANT
TO CONSIDER WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PRSD-300
M4-1B2-PC010-1
EPG
300
02 HORIZONTAL DRAIN CAP (I)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
iOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
g
g
mm
m
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-PC010-1 AND M4-1BI-PCOIO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. BECAUSE THE QD HAS AN
ALLOWABLE LEAK RATE, THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN THE
ACCUMULATION OF 02 IN THE ORBITER MID FUSELAGE AND A POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION. THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-301
NASA FMEA # : M4-1B2-LV013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV024
EPG
301
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-1 AND M4-1BI-LV013-1,
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. SCREEN B
SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS
A VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT
AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-302
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV024-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV024
EPG
302
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:. (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1B-LV024-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A
2/IR FOR THE ONORBIT PHASE ALSO, BECAUSE LOSS OF A FUEL CELL
CAUSES A PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISIDN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-303
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV024
EPG
303
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMAP/f_ :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1B!-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-304
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LVOI3-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(1) LV023
EPG
304
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/rUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-1 AND M4-1BI-LV013-1.---.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. SCREEN B
SHOULD BE PASSED PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.5.a. BECAUSE THERE IS
A VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. THE CIL RET_TION RATIONALE IS NOT
AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-305
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV013-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV023
EPG
305
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] " [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / c c 3 c [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-2 AND M4-1BI-LV013-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A
2/IR FOR THE ONORBIT PHASE ALSO BECAUSE LOSS OF A FUEL CELL
CAUSES A PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-306
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV023
EPG
306
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ I /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _ _ _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO'I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE-S_,_ITIS AGP_EABLE_ .......
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-307
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
307
02 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV011
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
t
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B'RV011"I AND M4'iBI-RV011-i.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAIq_D OPEN OR INTER_AL I_AKKGE, _ T_ CIL
RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY
SHOULD BE A 3 SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA PER NSTS 22206 SECTION
2 .3 .4 .b. 2 .a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. NOT
FAILING SCREEN B WOULD ALLOW THIS TO BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
i_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-308
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
308
02 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (1) RVOI1
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] "[ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
...... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV011-2 AND M4-1B1-RVOII-2.
THE FAILURE M_DE_S_FAILS_ C_SED. -A _T_}_AL CRITICALITY OF IR
WOULD RESULT IF BOTH MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVES FAIL CLOSED, ALONG
WITH A TANK RELIEF VALVE FAILED CLOSED, AND THAT SAME TANK'S
HEATERSq_A_ILED-ON. THE_ COULD BE OVERPRESSURIZED AND
BURST. SCREEN B IS NA PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.4.b.2.a.
BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-309
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
309
02 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (I) RV011
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-310
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
310
02 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (1) RV021
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....................
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV011-1 AND M4-1BI-RV011-1. _
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY
SHOULD BE A 3. SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA PER NSTS 22206 SECTION
2.3.4.b.2.a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. NOT
FAILING SCREEN B WOULD ALLOW THIS TO BE DELETED FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-311
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
311
02 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV021
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / 3 [ 3 [ N 3 [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /. ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B'RV011-2 AND M4-1B1-RV011"2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED.- _FUNCTiO]_ALCRITI_ALTTY OF IR
WOULD RESULT IF BOTH MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVES FAIL CLOSED, ALONG
WITH A TANK RELIEF VALVE FAILED CLOSED, AND THAT SAME TANK'S
HEATERS FAILED ON. THE LINES COULD BE OVERPRESSURIZED AND
BURST. SCREEN B IS NA PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.4.b.2.a BECAUSE
THE RELIEF VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-312
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B1-A01FSO-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPG
312
02 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (I) RV021
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] C ] C ]
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ! [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-1 AND M4-1B1-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERS THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-313
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV010-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
313
02 CHECK VALVE (2) CV021
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY sCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-CV010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-314
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV010-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
314
02 CHECK VALVE (2) CV021
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUN C A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
U
HI
m
u
mm
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l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-CVOI0-2.
THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 2 BECAUSE IF THE SAME TANK'S
RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO
CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE TANK.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-315
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
315
02 CHECK VALVE (2) CV021
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-A01FSO-I. THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
PRSD-316
M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
316
02 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
B. E. AMES
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
g
D
m
m
U
l
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
t / c i c J ] C' ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL
THE COMPONENTS COVERED BY THIS FMEA BE LISTED IN IT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-317
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
317
02 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN SHUTTING DOWN THE FUEL CELLS DUE TO
LACK OF 02. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MDAC FMEA BE DELETED
SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE IS NON-CREDIBLE.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-318
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
318
02 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45QII(-5) 05A
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
I
I
I
mm
U
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (FULL OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-319
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
o
319
02 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45QII(-5) 05A
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS _ CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3-/3
(If different from NASA)
] [ NA'] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (ZERO OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-320
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPG
320
02 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45QII(-5) 05A
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] CN] [N]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (OUT OF TOLERANCE)
OR COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER
WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-321
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: _PG
MDAC ID: 321
ITEM:
5) OIA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
02 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSORS (5) V45TII(-
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (FULL'OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-322
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
5) 01A
EPG
322
02 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSORS (5) V45TII(-
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (ZERO OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-323
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
5) 01A
EPG
323
02 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSORS (5) V45Tll(-
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ "NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON _IS FAILURE MODE (oUTOFTOLERANCE)
OR COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER
WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-324
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45TII(-5)07A
EPG
324
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 1 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (FULL OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-325
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45TII(-5)07A
EPG
325
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 1 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (ZERO OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-326
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45TII(-5)07A
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
EPG
326
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 1 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: ' (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (OUT OF TOLERANCE)
OR COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER
WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-327
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45TII (-5) 09A
EPG
327
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 2 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (FULL OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-328
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45Tll(-5)09A
EPG
328
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 2 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA ON THIS FAILURE MODE (ZERO OUTPUT) OR
COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WRITING A
FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-329
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45TII (-5) 09A
EPG
329
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 2 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)RECOMMENDATIONS-.
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA _ES NOT HAVE A _A ON THIS FAILURE:MODE (OUT OF TOLERANCE)
OR COMPONENT. FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER
WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-330
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-TK010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
330
02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (4) , (3), OR (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
rams
U
mm
m
U
L
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-TK010-1 AND M4-1BI-TK010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE NASA FMEA REVIEW
COMBINED THE FAILURE MODES OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE AND RUPTURE INTO
ONE FMEA. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A SEPARATE FMEA BE WRITTEN ON
THIS FAILURE MODE AND ITEM PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.1.a.1.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-331
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-TK010-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EPG
331
02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (4),
B. E. AMES
CRITICALITY =_...... REDUND_IcY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[. I ]
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
(3), OR (2)
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-TK010-1 AND M4-1BI-TK010-1.
MODE IS RUPTURE.
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ix]
[ ]
THE FAILURE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
PRSD-332
M4-1B2-TKOIO-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
332
02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (4), (3), OR (2)
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
W
i
b
m
m
M
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-TK010-2 AND M4-1BI-TK010-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS LOSS OF ANNULUS VACUUM. ALL THE REACTANT
COULD BE DEPLETED DURING RE-ENTRY DUE TO EXCESSIVE HEATING, AND
THIS COULD LOSE THE ORBITER.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-333
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-VPOI5-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 333
ITEM: 02 RELIEF PORT (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY ..... REDUND_CY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ]. [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-VP015-1 AND M4-1BI-VP015-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS RESTRICTED FLOW. IF A TANK CHECK VALVE ALSO
FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO CONDUCTIVE HEAT
TRANSFER INTO THE TANK. SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA PER NSTS 22206
SECTION 2.3.4.b.2.a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF PORT IS STANDBY
REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-334
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
334
02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (4) RVO10,RVO20,RV410,RV460
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C N ] [ ] [ ]
mm
s
l
I
mm
I
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S: 04-1B-RV010-1 FOR 02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (2) -
RV0i0, RV020 AND M4-1Bi-RV0i0-i FOR 02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (3) -
RV010, RV020, RV410. THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL
LEAKAGE. THE NEW NASA FMEA MENTIONS THIS FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT, YET___ _
IT STILL PASSES THEIR SCREEN B. THE RELIEF VALVE IS A STANDBY
REDUNDANT SYSTEM AND THEREFORE THE B SCREEN SHOULD BE NA PER NSTS
222Q_ SECTION 2.3.4.b.2.a, THE
HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3 FOR GREATER THAN TWO TANK
SETS. CHANGING THIS WOULD ALLOW DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE
FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-335
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV010-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
EPG
335
02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (4) RV010,RV020,RV410,RV460
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If:different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA, S: 04-1B-RV010"2FOR 02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (2) -
RV010, RV020 AND M4-1B1-RV010-2 FOR 02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (3) -
RV010, RV020, RV410. THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED. IF THE
SAME TANK'S CHECK VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD
OCCUR DUE TO CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE TANK. SCREEN B IS
NA PER NSTS 22206 SECTION 2.3.4.b.2.a. BECAUSE THE RELIEF
VALVE IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-336
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
E_G _ _
336
02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5) RV010,RV020,RV410,RV460
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUN C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
L
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g
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MQDEIS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. NASA COVERED THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE EFFECT IS
THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-337
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
B2(4 OR 3)
EPG
337
02 TANK HEATER ELEMENT AI(5), A2(5), BI(4 OR 3),
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
C ] C ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT. THE FAILURE MODE
IS FAILS ON. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MDAC FMEA BE DELETED
SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE IS REALLY ONLY AN EFFECT THAT IS THE
RESULT OF THE HEATER SWITCH FAILING ON. THIS FAILURE MODE
IS COVERED IN THE MDAC EPD&C/PRSD ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-338
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
B2(4 OR 3)
EPG
338
02 TANK HEATER ELEMENT AI(5), A2(5), BI(4 OR 3),
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ s /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT HAVE A FMEA FOR THIS COMPONENT. THE FAILURE MODE
IS FAILS OFF. INOPERATIVE HEATERS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF 02 PRESSURE
TO THE FUEL CELLS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-339
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT018-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
339
02 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALEi (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT018-1 AND M4-1BI-MT018-1.
THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS FULL OUTPUT. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE MODE
IS LOSS OF OUTPUT INCLUDING ERRONEOUS SIGNAL. THIS FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE INADEQUATE 02 SUPPLY PRESSURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-340
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT018-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 340
ITEM: 02 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT018-1 AND M4-1BI-MT018-1 .......
THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS ZERO OUTPUT. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE MODE
IS LOSS OF OUTPUT INCLUDING ERRONEOUS SIGNAL. THE TANK COULD
RUPTURE STARTING 9 HOURS AFTER TANK RESIDUAL LEVEL IS REACHED.
THE OFF POSITION OF THE SWITCH IS A REDUND_cY. IF THE
HEATERS OF BOTH TANKS 1 AND 2 OR 3 AND 4 ARE SELECTED TO THE
AUTOMATIC MODE, THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE A 3/1R, BECAUSE THEIR
TANK SENSOR LOGIC WOULD BE CONNECTED, AND BOTH TANK PAIR'S
SENSORS WOULD HAVE TO FAIL. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A SEPARATE
FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BECAUSE ITS EFFECT IS
VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM A FAILURE OF FULL OUTPUT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-341
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT018-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 341
ITEM: 02 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEAIS 04-1B-MT018-1 AND M4-1BI-MT018-1.
THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE NASA FMEA FAILURE
MODE IS LOSS OF OUTPUT INCLUDING ERRONEOUS SIGNAL. THIS COULD
CAUSE A RANGE OF RESULTS, FROM REACTANT PRESSURE BEING TOO LOW TO
REACTANT DEPLETION AND A TANK RUPTURE STARTING 9 HOURS
AFTER THE TANK RESIDUAL LEVEL IS REACHED. SENSOR READINGS NEAR
ZERO COULD CAUSE THE TANK HEATERS TO BE ON IF THE HEATERS OF BOTH
TANKS 1 AND 2, OR 3 AND 4 ARE SELECTED TO THE AUTOMATIC MODE.
THE REDUNDANT PATH IS PUTTING THE HEATER SWITCH IN THE OFF
POSITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
PRSD-342
M4-1B2-MTOIO-I
EPG
342
02 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
i
mm
g
mm
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I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT010-1 AND M4-1B1-MT010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FULL OUTPUT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-343
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT010-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPG
343
02 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
B. E. AMES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-HT010-1 AND M4-1BI-MT010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS ZERO OUTPUT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-344
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-MT010-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
344
02 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT010-1 AND M4-1BI-MT010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS OUT OF TOLERANCE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-345
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-PC010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 345
ITEM: 02 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL AND VENT QD CAPS M4-1B2-
(9), M4-1BI-(7), 04-IB-(5)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-MT010-1 AND M4-1BI-MT010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. BECAUSE THE QD HAS AN
ALLOWABLE LEAK RATE, THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN THE
ACCUMULATION OF 02 IN THE ORBITER MID FUSELAGE AND A POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION. SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA PER NSTS 22206 SECTION
2.3.4.b.2.a. BECAUSE THE CAP IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM TO THE
QD.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-346
NASA FMEA #: M4"iB2-PD010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VENT QD'S (5)
EPG ....
346
02 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK DISCONNECTS (4) AND
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-PD010-1 AND M4-1BI-PD010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
RETENTION RATIONALE IS NOT AVAILABLE. IF THE CAP ALSO LEAKED, 02
COULD AC__T_E _N THE MID FUSE_GE AND POSSIBLY RESULT IN AN
EXPLOSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-347
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VENT QD'S (5)
EPG
347
02 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK DISCONNECTS (4) AND
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA DID NOT INCLUDE THIS FAILURE MODE (INABILITY TO
MATE/DEMATE). FOR COMPLETENESS, NASA MAY WANT TO CONSIDER
WRITING A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-348
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV013-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 348
ITEM: 02 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVE POSITION INDICATORS
(3) V45XII50E, V45XI155E, V45XII60E
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-3 AND M4-1BI-LV013-3.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS OPEN WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED. THE
NASA FMEA INC_DE_ ANALYSI_ON _THEO2 FUEL CE_ VALVESWITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE NASA FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE POSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLY. THE NASA FMEA IS INCONSISTENT IN THE
FAILURE DETECTAB_ IN FLiG}{T SECTION; THE FMEA MENTIONS THAT THE
INDICATOR READS CLOSED, BUT THE VALVE IS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-349
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV013-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 349
ITEM: 02 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVE POSITION INDICATORS
(3) V45XI150E, V45X1155E, V45X1160E
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / J E ] c c
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-4 AND M4-1BI-LV013-4.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS OPEN WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS ON THE 02 FUEL CELL VALVES WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. THESE
SHOULD READ FAILS CLOSED, NOT OPEN. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT
THE NASA FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE POSITION INDICATOR RATHER
THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE OPERATING
PERFECTLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-350
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 350
ITEM: H2 FUEL CELL REACTANTVALVE POSITION INDICATORS
(3) V45X2150E, V45X2155E, V45X2!6QE
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-3 AND M4-1BI-LV033-3_
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS C_SED WHEN THE VALVE IS OPEN. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS ON THE 02 FUEL CELL VALVES WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. THESE
SHOULD READ FAILS CLOSED, NOT OPEN. IT IS RECOMMENDED POSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLy. THE NASA FMEA IS INCONSISTENT IN THE ....
FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT SECTION; THE FMEA MENTIONS THAT THE
INDICTOR READS CLOSED, BUT THE VALVE IS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-351
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDACID: 351
ITEM: H2 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVE POSITION INDICATORS
(3) V45X2150E, V45X2155E, V45X2160E
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-4 AND M4-1BI-LV033-4.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS CLOSED WHEN THE VALVE IS OPEN. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS ON THE H2 FUEL CELL VALVES WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. THESE
SHOULD READ FAILS CLOSED, NOT OPEN. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT
THE FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE POSITION INDICATOR RATHER THAN
THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE OPERATING PERFECTLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-352
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV012-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 352
ITEM: 02 ECLSS SYSTEM SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR
(2) V45XI080E, V45X1083E
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV012-3 AND M4-1BI-LV012-3.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS OPEN WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS ON THE ECLSS VALVES WITH THE FAILURE
MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. IT IS
_CO_NDED THAT THE NASA FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE POSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLY. THE NASA FMEA IS INCONSISTENT IN THE
FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT SECTION; THE FMEA MENTIONS THAT THE
INDICATOR READS CLOSED, BUT THE VALVE IS OPEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-353
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV012-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 353
ITEM: 02 ECLSS SYSTEM SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR
(2) V45XI080E, V45XI083E
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV012-4 AND M4-1BI-LV012-4.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS CLOSED WHEN THE VALVE IS OPEN. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS ON THE ECLSS VALVES WITH THE FAILURE
MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. THESE SHOULD
READ FAILS CLOSED, NOT OPEN. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE NASA
FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE POSITION INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE
VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE OPERATING PERFECTLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-354
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV011-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 354
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD VALVE POSITION INDICATORS (2)
V45XII41E, V45X1146E
LEAD ANALYST: B. El AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV011-3 AND M4-1BI-LV011-3 ......
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS OPEN WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED. THE
NASA FMEAINC_DES ANALYSIS ON BOTH 02 MANIFOLD VALVES WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATORFAILS OPEN. IT IS
RECO-MMEN_D_b_THAT THE_NAS_F_A_I_M BE C_%NGED TO THE POSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLY. THE NASA FMEA IS INCONSISTENT IN THE
FAILU_RE--DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT SECTION; THE FMEA MENTIONS THAT THE
INDICATOR READS CLOSED, BUT THE VALVE IS OPEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-355
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LVOII-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 355
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD VALVE POSITION INDICATORS (2)
V45XII41E, V45XlI46E
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEAIS 04-1B-LV011-4 AND M4-1B1-LV011-4.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS CLOSED WHEN THE VALVE IS OPEN. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS ON BOTH 02 MANIFOLD VALVES WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATORS FAILS CLOSED. IT
IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE NASA FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE
POSITION INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE
COULD BE OPERATING PERFECTLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-356
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV031-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 356
ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD VALVE POSITION INDICATORS (2)
V45X2141E, V45X2146E
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEAIS 04-1B-LV031-3 AND M4-1BI-LV031-3i -_
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS OPEN WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS ON BOTH H2 MANIFOLD VALVES WITH THE
FAILUREMODE BEING sWITCH-_SITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. IT IS
_COMMENDED T_TTHENASA _ ITEM BE CHANG__I_qEq_gSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLY. THE NASA FMEA IS INCONSISTENT IN THE
FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT SECTION; THE FMEA MENTIONS THAT THE
INDICATOR READS CLOSED, BUT THE VALVE IS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-357
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV031-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45X2141E, V45X2146E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
EPG
357
H2 MANIFOLD VALVE POSITION INDICATORS (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV031-4 AND M4-1B1-LV031-4.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS CLOSED WHEN THE VALVE IS OPEN. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS ON BOTH H2 MANIFOLD VALVES WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS CLOSED. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE NASA FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE
POSITION INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE
COULD BE OPERATING PERFECTLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-358
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-FL010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
358
02 FILTER (4) FL010,FL020,FL410,FL460
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
D
b
D
I
mm
ms
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ -] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S: 04-1B-FL010-1 FOR 02 FILTER (2) - FL010, FL020
AND M4-1BI-FL010-1 FOR 02 FILTER (3) - FL010, FL020, FL410..
THE FAILURE MODE IS RESTRICTED FLOW. THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS
A 2 BECAUSE IF THE SAME TANK'S RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED,
AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO CONDUCTIVE HEAT TRANSFER INTO THE
TANK.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-359
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV010-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
359
02 CHECK VALVE (1) CV020
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-CV010-1 AND M4-1BI-CV010-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A 3.
[ ]
[ ]
THE HARDWARE
L
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-360
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV010-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
360
02 CHECK VALVE (I) CV020
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CP]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
B
m
m
I
z
[]
h
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-CV010-2 AND M4-1BI-CV010-2.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS CLOSED OR RESTRICTED FLOW. THE
HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IF THE SAME TANK'S RELIEF
VALVE ALSO FAILED CLOSED, AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR DUE TO
CONDUCTI_ HEAT TRANSFERiNTO THE TANK. THE RETENTION RATIONALE
IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-361
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-A01FSO-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
361
02 CHECK VALVE (i) CV020
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-A01FSO-I AND M4-1BI-A01FSO-I.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE NASA FMEA COVERS THE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF MOST COMPONENTS IN ONE FMEA, AND SINCE THE
EFFECT IS THE SAME, IT IS AGREEABLE.
i
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-362X
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV045-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45X2195E
EPG
362
H2 GSE SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR (1)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV045-4 AND M4-1BI-LV045-4.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS OPEN WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS OF THE H2 GSE SUPPLY VALVE, WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE NASA FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE POSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-363X
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV045-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45X2195E
EPG
363
H2 GSE SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR (I)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV045-3 AND M4-1BI-LV045-3.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS CLOSED WHEN THE VALVE IS OPEN. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS OF THE H2 GSE SUPPLY VALVE, WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS CLOSED. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE NASA FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE POSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-364X
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV015-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45XlI95E
EPG
364
02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR (I)
LEAD ANALYST: B. E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV015-4 AND M4-1BI-LV015-4.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS OPEN WHEN THE VALVE IS CLOSED. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS OF THE 02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE, WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS OPEN. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE NASA _BE CHANGE_I_OTHE POSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-365X
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV015-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
V45XII95E
EPG
365
02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B.E. AMES
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV015-3 AND M4-1BI-LV015-3.
THE FAILURE MODE IS READS CLOSED WHEN THE VALVE IS OPEN. THE
NASA FMEA INCLUDES ANALYSIS OF THE 02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE, WITH THE
FAILURE MODE BEING SWITCH POSITION INDICATOR FAILS CLOSED. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE NASA FMEA ITEM BE CHANGED TO THE POSITION
INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE VALVE ITSELF, SINCE THE VALVE COULD BE
OPERATING PERFECTLY.
REPORT DATE 2/25/88 C-167
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CRITICAL ITEMS
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APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
H
MDAC
ID
mE_m
20O
202
211
218
229
231
234
237
240
243
246
248
255
256
258
259
261
262
267
270
272
275
278
ITEM
H2 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK
DISCONNECT (4) & VENT QD'S (5)
H2 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL AND
VENT QD CAPS (9)
H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5) -
RV030,RV040,RVSO0,RV560
H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (5)
H2 LINES, COMPONENTS, &
FITTINGS
H2 _IFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE
(I) RV031
H2 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE
(I) RV041
H2 CHECK VALVE (2) CV031,CV041
H2 CHECK VALVE (i) CV030
H2 CHECK VALVE (i) CV040
H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (i)
TYPE II, CLASS 8
H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN CAP (I)
H2 FUEL CELL I SOLENOID
REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV033
H2 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV033
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV043
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV043
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV044
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV044
H2 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE
(I) LV045
H2 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-0 QUICK
DISCONNECT (i) PD035
02 CHECK VALVE (i) CV010
02 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE
(i) LV015
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 1
SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV012
FAILURE MODE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL
LEAKAGE)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL
LEAKAGE)
FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL
LEAKAGE)
FAILS OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL
LEAKAGE )
FAILS OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL
LEAKAGE )
FAILS OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL
LEAKAGE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE ALSO)
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE ALSO)
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE ALSO)
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_mm_
279
281
282
284
289
290
298
3OO
301
302
304
3O5
307
310
313
317
332
334
345
346
359
ITEM
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 1
SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV012
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 2
SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV022
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 2
SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV022
02 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-0 QUICK
DISCONNECT (i) PD015
02 FUEL CELL i SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV013
02 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV013
02 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (i)
02 HORIZONTAL DRAIN CAP (I)
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV024
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV024
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV023
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV023
02 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE
(i) RV011
O2'MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE
(I) RV021
02 CHECK VALVE (2) CV021
02 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (5)
02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5)
RV010,RV020,RV410,RV460
02 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL AND VENT
QD CAPS (9)
02 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK
DISCONNECTS (4) AND VENT QD'S (5)
02 CHECK VALVE (I) CV020
FAILURE MODE
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE ALSO)
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
FAILS CLOSED
FAILED OPEN (ALSO
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
FAILED OPEN (ALSO
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE ALSO)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LOSS OF ANNULUS VACUUM
FAILED OPEN (ALSO
INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE ALSO)
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APPENDIX B
DETAILED A]g]t_YBZ8
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
ii, Analysis of the EPG/PRSD, (5 December 1986). Prior results
were obtained independently and documented before starting the
FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was
performed to address failure modes not previously considered by
the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed,
parent assembly and function performed. For each failure mode
possible causes are identified, and hardware and functional
criticality for each mission phase are determined as described in
NSTS 22206, _nstructions for Preparation of FMEA and C_L, i0
October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the bottom
of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at the
top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional CritiCalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA _ Not Applicable
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYST_ _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 12/31/86 HIG_ST CRITICALITY HDW/F_C
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 362 ABORT: 3/3
g
J
I
ITEM: H2 GSE SUPPLY VAL_ POSITION INDICATOR (i)
V45X2195E
FAIL_ MODE: _DS OPEN MEN VAL_ C_SED
SUBSYS 7_AD: M. HIOTT
_D _ALYST: S. GOTCH
m
B__ HIE_CHY:
I) EPG
2) P_D
lid
3 ) HYDROGEN DISTRIB_ION
4) H2 VAL_ MODUT._ 2
5)
6) -,
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/F_C =
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3 l
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 i
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUND_CY S_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] =
i
THE
MID _SE_GE
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: E_RICAL FAIL_, CO_OSION, VIB_TION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONAT_: ..........
THE SENSOR IS USED TO TELL THE C_W OF VAL_'S POSITION.
NO_Y THE VAL_ IS C_SED AFTER P__CH ACTIVITIES.
FAIL_ MY NOT BE AB_ TO BE _RIFIED,
mm
z
i
=
g
_FE_NCES:
I
i
mm
_PORT DATE 02/24/88 E-2
mm
rw
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/31/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 363 ABORT:
ITEM:
V45X2195E
FAILUREMODE:
H2 GSE SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR (i)
READS CLOSED WHEN VALVE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) H2 VALVE MODULE 2
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORB_T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SENSOR IS USED TO TELL THE CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION.
NORMALLY THE VALVE IS CLOSED AFTER PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES.
FAILURE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BE VERIFIED.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
THE
E
w
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/31/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
364 ABORT:
ITEM:
V45XlI95E
FAIL_ MODE:
02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR (i)
READS OPEN WHEN VALVE CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EPG
2 ) PRS D
3 ) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: __
THE SENSOR IS USED TO TELL THE CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION.
NORMALLY THE VALVE IS CLOSER AFTER PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES. THE
FAILURE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BE VERIF_ED_ ............
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/31/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 365 ABORT:
ITEM:
V45XlI95E
FAILURE MODE:
02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR (I)
READS CLOSED WHEN VALVE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2 ) PRSD
3 ) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SENSOR IS USED TO TELL THE CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION.
NORMALLY THE VALVE IS CLOSED AFTER PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES.
FAILURE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BE VERIFIED.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
THE
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mAPPENDTX F
NASA FF,EA TO I0A W01_SHEET CR088 REFERENCE/RECOHHENDATION8
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
I
L J
=_
1
2
3
4
.
6
7
8
9
i0
11
12
13
IOA recommends that a FMEA for this failure mode be
written.
IOA recommends maintaining all the components listed on
this sheet in the NASA FMEA/CIL list to ensure
visibility whenever more than two tank sets fly.
IOA concurs with NASA's re-evaluation.
IOA recommends changing the hardware criticality to a
3.
IOArecommends changing the hardware criticality to a 3
for greater than two tank sets.
IOA recommends that screen B be NA per NSTS 22206
section 2.3.4.b.2.a. because the component is standby
redundant.
IOA recommends passing screen B per NSTS 22206 section
2.3.5.a. because the failure mode is detectable with a
valve position indicator.
The CIL retention rationale was not available for
review.
IOA recommends that the NASA FMEA item be changed from
the valve to the valve position indicator.
IOA recommends that a separate FMEA be written for this
failure mode.
IOA generated a non-credible failure mode.
IOA generated a failure mode covered by EPD&C.
IOA recommends that the NASA FMEA hardware criticality
be a 2 for the onorbit phase also, because loss of a
fuel cell impacts the mission.
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOMMENDATIONS
t IDENTIFIERS I_ NASA ;: IDARECOMMENDATIONSI
__ I ................................................ !
..........................................II ............,,
I NASA I IDA _ICRIT I SCREENS II CRIT _ SCREENS OTHER _ ISSUE:
I FMEA NUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBERIIHWIF I A B C
' ' II '
M4-1B2-PDB3B-I
M4-1BI-AOIFSH-I
M4-1BI-ABIFSD-I
M4-tB2-AOIFSB-I
M4-1B2-ASIFSH-I
PRSD-2BI _I /
.._u-_. II l I
PRGD-218 II / I
PRSD-219 II / I
PRSD-22B I_ / I
PRSD-221 t_ l I
PRSD-222 _I l I
PRSD-223 II / I
PRSD-224 II l
PRSD-225 _ /
PRSD-226 I_ / I
PRSD-227 II / I
PRSD-229 II / I
PRBD-23B II / I
.PRSD-247 II l I
PRSD-271 II / I
PRSD-285 II / I
PRSD-299 _ l I
PRSD-314 II / I
PRSD:3i7 :: / :
P_SD-31B :_ l I
PRSD-_19 _ /
PRSD-32_ I_ l I
PRSD_321 I_ I
PRSD-322 II ! l
PRSD-323 II / I
PRSD-324 II / I
PRSD-325 :_ / :
PRSD-32& II l I
PRSD-327 I! / I
PRSD-_2B II / I
PRSD-329 :_ / I
PRSD-337 _I l I
PRSD-33B _I / I
PRSD-347 _ / I
PRSD-2@B II 211R I P F P
PRSD-245 II 111 I NA NA NA
PRSD-312 I_ I/I I NA NA NA
PRSD-291 II I/i I NA NA NA
PRS_'213 _I I/i I NA NA NA
PRSD-22B :: I/i i NANA NA
PRSD-233 II I/i I NA NA NA
PRSD-236 II 111 I NA NA NA
PRSD-239 II !/l I
PRGD-242 II i/i I NA NA NA
II HW/F I A B C
I ==._=...=== ======= ==
•,/_ NANA NA
: /
311R P P P
._/3 NANA HA
.3i3 NANA NA
I 3/.x NA NA NA
I 313 NA NA NA
3/3 NA NA NA
313 NA NA NA
3/3 NA NA NA
I o1,> NA NA NA
I 3/3 NA NA NA
/
211R P P P
I 3/3 NA NA NA
: 3/3 NA NA NA
313 NA NA NA I
3/3 NA NA NA i
2/IR P P P I
I / II
I 3/3 NANANA I
', 3/3 NA NA NA i
I 313 NA NANA i
I 313 NA NA NA 1
t 313 NA NANA I
I 3/3 NA NANA I
"7
', 0/3 NA NA NA i
I 3/3 NA NA NA i
3/3 NA NA NA i
3/3 NA NA NA i
+I.: NA NA NA 1
I 313 NA NANA I
', / 12
', 3/IR P P P I
I 3/x_ NANANA 1
/
', /
/
/
/
/
/
/
/ 3
(SEELEGENDCODE) _ i
.... _ ............... _.......
I I X
12
I I X
i I X
I I X
I I X
I _ X
I _ X
11 I
I I X
I I X
I. I X
I X
X
I X
I
I X
X
X
X
X
X
X
I X
I X
X
X
X
I X
B
3
3 :
3 I
2
3
3 I
3
I X
I
I
=_ = =_ = = = = =. = .. =. = = = = = =.._. = = =- = .-= = .-.-= = == == = = _-.-= = = = = == = ._ = _-= == = = = = = =-_-'_-_-= =----. = = .-= • = = = 5= = = =--= = = =--=== = = = = = = = =--= = = = = = = = = = = = =
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NASA ] IOA ]] CRIT I SCREENS
I FMEANUMBER _ ASSESSMENTUMBERi] HW/F I A B C
; ! _ ;l
M_-IB2-A_IFSH-I
M4-1B2-ABIFSO-I
M4-1B2-CVB1B-I
M4-1B2-CV030-2
M_-IB2-FLBIB-I
M4-1B2-FLB3B-i
M4-1B2-LVBiI-I
M4-1B2-LVBII-2
M4-1B2-LVg11-3
M4-1B2-LVBII-4
M4-1B2-LVB12-1
M4-1B2-LVg12-2
M4-1B2-LVB12-3
M4-1B2-LVg12-4
M4-1B2-LVg13-1
M4-1B2-LVB13-2
M4-1B2-LV013-3
M4-iB2-LV_13-4
PRSD-254
PRSD-257
PRSD-2bB
PRSD-2&3
PRSD-2b_
PRSD-269
PRSD-274
PRSD-277
PRSD-2BB
PRSD-2B3
PRSD-294
PRSD-2_7
PRSD-3B3
PRSD-SB_
PRSD-3B?
PRSD-315
PRSD-316
PRSD-336
PRSD-361
PRSD-272
PRSD-313
PRSD-359
PRSD-273
PRSD-36B
PRSD-237
PRSD-24B
PRSD-243
PRSD-241
PRSD-244
PRSD-358
PRSD-23B
PRSD-292
PRSD-295
PRSD-293
PRSD-29b
PRSD-354
PRSD-355
PRSD-27B
PRSD-2BI
PRSD-279
PRSD-2B2
PRSD-352
PRSD-353
PRSD-2B9
PRSD-3BI
PRSD-304
PRSD-29_
PRSD-3B5
PRSD-34B
PRSD-3+9 III I
II
i/i _ NA NA NA
i/i _ NANANA
I/I ] NA NA NA
iii I NA NA NA
i/I _ NA NA NA
I/I _ NA NA NA
i/I _ NA NA NA
i/l I NANANA
i/I _ NA NA NA
I/i _ NA NA NA
I/I I NA NA NA
I/I ] NANANA
I/I ] NANA NA
I/i I NA NA NA
i/I i NA NA NA
I/I I
I/I ] NA NA NA
I/i ] NA NA NA
Ill _ NA NA NA
2/IR._P P P
2/1R = P P P
2/1R ] P P P
211R I P P P
=
2tlR I
21!R :I P P P
2/1R I P P P
211R t P P P
2/IR _ P P P
2/IR ] P P P
2/IR _ P P P
2/IR ] P F P
2/IR _ P F P
3/IR _ P P P
311R _ P P P
313 _ NA NA NA
3/_ i NA NA NA
3/iR _ P F P
311R I P F P
311R I P P P
3/IR I P P P
313 _ NA NA NA
3/3 _ NA NA NA
211R I P F P
211R I P F P
2/IR ] P F P
2/IR I P P P
2/IR I P P P
313 [ NANANA
3/3 ] NA NA NA
]ICRIT I SCREENS ] OTHER ] ISSUE
I_HWIF I A B C _ (SEELEGENDCODE) I
I I
l I
I I
I I
I
l I
I
I
I I
I
I i
I I
I i
l I
] /
I /
I I
I I
I I
I I
l 3ilR
l I
I I
I I
i 311R
I
I I
I I
I I
[ I
I
I 31
31
I
I I
I
I I
I I
I
I I
I
I
,
I
[ I
I I
I
I
I
I
/
P P P
P P P
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
I
3
3, B
3, 8
3
3
3, 8
3, 8 -
3
3
4,7, 8
4, 7, 8
5
9
9
7,8
7, B
3
3
?
9
7, 8
7, 8
7:8
13
13
9
9
bIDENTIFIERS II NASA I: IOA RECOMMENDATIONS!
NASA I IOA IICRIT I SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE
I FMEA NUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBERIIHW/F I A B C ;IHW/F I A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE) ;
II 2flR I P F P II / P 7, B I XM4-1B2-LVe15-I
M4-1B2-LVOIS-2
M4-1B2-LV015-3
M4-1B2-LVOI5-4
M4-1B2-LV024-2
M4-1B2-LV031-1
M4-1B2-LV031-2
M4-1B2-LV031-3
M4-1B2-LVB31-4
M4-1B2-LVB33-1
M4-1B2-LV833-2
M4-1B2-LV033-3
M4-1B2-LVB33-4
M4-1B2-LV044-2
M4:1B2-LV045-1
M4-1B2-LVB45-2
M4-1B2-LV045-3
M4-182-LV045-4
M4-1B2-MTOIO-I
M4-IB2-MTB12-1
M4-1B2-MTBIS-I
M4-1B2-MTB30-I
M4-!B2-MT032-1
M4-1B2-MT039-1
M4-1B2-PCBIB-I
M4-1B2-PCB3B-I
PRSD-275
PRSD-27& If
PRSD-3&SX If
PRSD-364X =I
PRSD-302 If
PRSD-252 If
PRSD-2_4 If
PRSD-253 If
PRSD-265 If
PRSD-35& I I
PRSD-3._7 If
PRSD-255 If
PRSD-25B II
PRSD-2_I If
PRSD-25_ If
PRSD-25_ If
PRSD-350 If
PRSD-351 If
PRSD-262 If
PRSB-267 If
PRSD-268 If
,RSD-..'._._X If
PRSD-362X If
PRSD-342 If
PRSD-343 If
PRSD-344 If
PRSB-2B_ If
PRSD-2@7 If
PRSD-2BB If
PRSD-339 If
PRSD-340 If
PRSD-341 ,,"
PRSD-203 II
PRSD-204 II
PRSD-205
PRSD-249 If
PRSD-25B If
PRSD-251 If
PRSD-20_ If
PRSD'2_7 If
PRSD-208 If
PR_DL300 If
PRSD-345 If
PRSD-202 If
PRSD-24B If
PRSD-3% ',I
PRSD-2B+ I',
PRSD-29B "I I
PRSD-24& If
PRSD-27B If
i,I
M4-1B2-PBBIe-I
M4-1B2-PDBIS-I
M4-1B2-PD@25-1
M_-IB2-PDB32-1
M4-1B2-PDB35-1
313 I NA NA NAII
313 I NA NA NA II
313 I NA NA NA II
III I P P P II
211R I P F P II
211R I P F P II
3/IR I P P P
311R I P P P
313 I NA NA NA
313 I NANANA
2i1R ', P F P
2/IR I P F P
2/!R I P F P
2/IR I P P P
2ilR I P P P
3/3 I NA NA NA
.1+ I NA NA NA
1/1 :P P P
2/iR : P F P
_/_ , NA NA NA
3/3 I NA NA NA
3/_ I NA NANA
313 I NA NA NA
3/3 I NA NANA
3/3 I NA NANA
3/3 I NANANA
3/3 I NA NA NA
3/3 I NA NANA
311R I P P P
3/1R I P P P
3/1R I P P P
3i3 I NA NANA
3/3 ; NANA NA
3/3 I NA NA NA
3/3 I NA NA NA
3/3 I NA NA NA
3/3 I NA NA NA
3/IR I P P P
3/IR I P P P
SIIR I P P P
2iiR i NA NA NA
2/IR I NA NA NA
I/i I NANA NA
i/I I NA NA NA
2/IR I P F P
2/IR I P F P
2/IR I P F P
2/IR I P F P
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3/IR P NAP
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iii NA NA NA
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